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SOCRATES AND PLATO

AND

EVOLUTION ETHICS

With important Examination Questions

BY

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PREFATORY NOTE

At the request of some of my Tinnevelly friends, I prepared this book and have published it, thereby extending its usefulness to all Philosophy Students who prepare for B. A. Degree Examination this year. All suggestions tending to the improvement of the book will be thankfully received.

MADRAS,
21st April 1894.

M. S. P.

SOCRATES.

'How,' she cried, 'You love
The metaphysics! read and earn our prize,
A golden brooch : beneath an emerald plane
Sits Diotima,* teaching him that died
Of hemlock ; our device ; wrought to the life ;
——*The Princess* c. iii.

Socrates is a literary Melchizedec.†—*Rev. J. Wells.*

The Samuel Johnson of Greece, he had no Boswell—*Ibid.*

What a pity that the Hugh Miller of Athens has not bequeathed to us the Story of *My Schools and School Masters!*
——*Ibid.*

PLATO.

'The great pagan theologue'— *Howe.*

'Apollo begat Æsculapius to heal the body, and Plato to heal the soul.'——*Greek Proverb.*

A writer of 'musical and prolific language that gives a soul to the objects of sense, and a body to the abstractions of philosophy.'—*Gibbon.*

'The poet or maker of ideas, satisfying the wants of his own age, and providing the instruments of thought for future generations.'— *Jowett.*

It must be so—Plato, thou reasonest well!—
Else whence this pleasing hope, this fond desire,
This longing after immortality?
Or whence this secret dread, and inward horror,
Of falling into naught? Why shrinks the soul
Back on herself, and startles at destruction?
'Tis the divinity that stirs within us;
'Tis heaven itself that points out an hereafter,
And intimates eternity to man.
Eternity! thou pleasing, dreadful thought!—*Addison's Cato* v.i

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* *Diotima* (*e*), a woman who gave lectures upon philosophy which Socrates attended. The Princess, Ida, represents Diotima sitting under the shadow of a spreading plane-tree wrought out of an emerald with such skill as almost to seem alive.

† A King of Salem, to whom Abraham paid tithes or gave the tenth part. Some thought him superior to Christ, some paid him adoration, and some believed him to be Christ himself or the Holy Ghost.

PART I.

SOCRATES AND PLATO.

[THE materials for this book are taken mainly from the works of Dr. Zeller, Ferrier, Mayor, Jowett, Grote, Tenneman, Ueberweg, Schwegler, Church, Brandis, DEQuincey, Chambers and Mackintosh.]

SOCRATES.

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1. Life, B. C. 469—399. Socrates, the most celebrated philosopher of all antiquity, was a native of Athens. His father, Sophroniscus, was a statuary; his mother, Phaenarete, was a midwife. For sometime he followed the occupation of his father and executed the group of clothed Graces. His physical constitution was healthy, robust and enduring to an extraordinary degree. With the frame of a Hercules he united the physiognomy of a satyr. To an Athenian, beauty of body was the seal of the soul's inner beauty. Hence, his ugly physiognomy excited the jests both of his friends and enemies, and his disciple Plato compared him 'to the gallipots of apothecaries, which, on the outside, had apes and owls, and antiques, but contained within sovereign and precious liquors and confections.' Blessed with a leonine body, he appeared like the rest of his countrymen in the field of battle and rescued two of his friends and disciples, Xenophon and Alcibiades. As an hoplite,[1] he thrice[2] distinguished himself and served the cause of his country. His independence of spirit he manifested on two memorable occasions, once during the trial of the ten generals,[3]

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[1] Heavy armed foot soldier.

[2] At the siege of Potidaea, at the battle of Delium and and at Amphipolis.

[3] After the battle of Arginusæ (in 406), three small islands near the continent between Mitylene and Methymna, where the Lacedæmonian fleet was conquered by Conon, the Athenian, the ten generals in command were publicly arraigned for neglecting to obtain the bodies of the killed to receive the rites of interment. The clamour for their condemnation was so great that the Court wished to proceed in violation of the legal forms.

when he, as the presiding judge, refused firmly, in spite of all personal hazard, to put an unconstitutional question to the vote, and, for a second time, when the Thirty Tyrants passed an order to apprehend Leon, the Salaminion, which he refused to obey. At what time Socrates relinquished his profession as a statuary we do not know; but it is certain that, called away from his meaner employment, raised from the workshop, by Crito who admired his genius and courted his friendship, he took to Philosophy and, under Archelaus and Anaxagoras, laid the foundation of that exemplary virtue which succeeding ages have ever loved and venerated. He bore injuries with patience and the insults of malice or resentment he not only treated with contempt, but even received with a mind that expressed some concern, and felt compassion for the depravity of human nature.[4] So singular and so venerable a character was admired by the most enlightened of the Athenians. His virtues combined with personal magnetism drew around him a number of illustrious pupils, whom he instructed by his exemplary life,[5] as well as by his doctrines. He had no particular place where to deliver his lectures, but as, in the case of Euripides,[6] the good of his countrymen and the reformation of their currupted morals, (without regard to the aggregation of riches) was the object of his study, he was present everywhere, and drew the attention of his auditors either in the groves of Academus, the Lyceum, or on the banks of

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[4] His wife, *Xanthippe*, the classical type of the shrew, was a woman of no culture and was hence unfit to be his partner in life. Yet Socrates unflinchingly submitted himself to her lava stream of fury and turned his domestic affliction into a means of grace, into domestic discipline whereby he achieved that thorough self-mastery without which no one could be a real philosopher. That the saying 'After thunder we usually have rain' was applied by Socrates to his wife who, after an angry scolding, poured over him a pailful of foul water is well known.

[5] Socrates was remarkably frugal and temperate. Bread, water and a few olives served him, as they serve the Athenian boor to-day.

[6] Though Euripides and Socrates had the same end in view, the former worked for it by didactic addresses insinuated through men's feelings amidst the interest of tragic story, and the latter appealed at once to their understandings and amidst the business or pastime of real life.

the Ilyssus. He spoke with freedom on every subject, religious as well as civil, and, in his practice of mental midwifery, he fought unweariedly against all false appearance and conceit of knowledge.[7] The use of the Socratic *elenchus*,[8] his general neutrality on questions of politics and his decisive energy on particular political occasions combined with the democratic reaction after the overthrow of the Thirty created him enemies of whom Melitus was the chief. At his instigation, Aristophanes, in his comedy of *The Clouds (Nubes)*, undertook to ridicule the venerable character of Socrates and caricature his teaching on the stage;[9] and when once the way was open to calumny and defamation, the fickle and licentious populace paid no reverence to the philosopher whom they had before regarded as a being of a superior order. When this had succeeded, Melitus stood forth to criminate him, together with Anytus and Lycon, and the philosopher was summoned before the tribunal of the Five Hundred. He was accused of corrupting the Athenian youth, of making innovations in the religion of the Greeks and of ridiculing the many gods whom the Athenians worshipped. In his defence, Lysias, one of the most celebrated orators of the age, composed an oration in a labored and pathetic style which Socrates compared to sicyonian shoes (which though fitting, were proofs of effeminacy) and rejected as neither manly nor expressive of fortitude. He modestly said that what he possessed was applied for the service of the Athenians; it was his wish to make his fellow citizens happy and it was a duty which he performed by the special command of the Gods "whose authority" said he

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[7] This refers to the teaching of the Sophists, (encyclopedic hawkers of knowledge) a class of men who taught eloquence, philosophy and politics in ancient Greece, and who, by their use of vain subtleties and false axioms, drew upon themselves general hatred and contempt. Hence the word *sophistry* meaning now reasoning sound in appearance only.

[8] An argument by which the adversary is forced to contradict himself.

[9] There is in it, first, an absurd caricature of a natural philosopher, and then a caricature, nearer the truth, of a Sophist. Roll the two together and we have Aristophanes's picture of Socrates.

emphatically to his judges "I regard more than yours." Such language from a man who was accused of a capital crime, astonished and irritated the judges and Socrates was condemned, but only by a majority of three voices; and when he was demanded, according to the spirit of the Athenian laws, to pass sentence on himself and to mention the death he preferred, the philosopher said, "for my attempts to teach the Athenian youth justice and moderation and render the rest of my countrymen more happy, let me be maintained at the public expense the remaining years of my life in the Prytaneum, an honor, O Athenians, which I deserve more than the victors of the Olympic games. They make their countrymen more happy in appearance, but I have made you so in reality." This exhasperated the judges in the highest degree, and he was condemned to drink hemlock. But his execution was put off for thirty days owing to the solemn celebration of the Delian festivals.[10] During this period, he was visited by his friends to whom he told his opinions in support of the immortality of the soul[11] and reprobated with acrimony the prevalent custom of suicide. When the hour to drink the poison was come, the executioner presented him the cup with tears in his eyes. Socrates received it with composure, and after he had made a libation to the Gods, he drank it with an unaltered countenance, and a few moments after he expired. Such was the end of a man whom the uninfluenced answer of the oracle of Delphi had pronounced the wisest of mankind.

The most striking features of Socrates's character are well set out in Tennyson's often-quoted lines:—

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[10] These festivals annually celebrated by the Athenians in Delos were instituted by Theseus, who, when he was going to Crete, made a vow that if he returned victorious, he would yearly visit in a solemn manner the temple of Delos. During the festival, it was not lawful to put to death any malefactor.

[11] This doctrine is found fully discussed in Plato's *Phaedo*. From the resources of experience as well as nature and observation, Socrates perceived the indiscriminate dispensation of good and evil to mankind by the hand of Heaven, and he was convinced that none but the most inconsiderate would incur the displeasure of their Creator to avoid poverty or sickness or gratify a sensual appetite, which must at the end harass their soul with remorse and the consciousness of guilt.

Self-reverence, self-knowledge, self-control,
These three alone lead man to sovereign powers.
Yet not for power, (power of herself
Would come uncalled for,) but to live by law,
Acting the law we live by without fear;
And because right is right, to follow right
Were wisdom in the scorn of consequence.

2. **The age of Socrates**. He lived in the most stimulating epoch of the golden age of ancient Greek thought. His boyhood and middle age fall within the glory period of Greece. At Marathon and Salamis a handful of Greeks had conquered the millions of Persia and won freedom for the world. These victories gave an enormous stimulus to Greek intellect, and ushered in a period of the highest creative genius in the history of mankind. Themistocles, Cimon, and Pericles then changed the city from brick to marble; Greece became the 'Holy Land of the Ideal' and Athens the metropolis of the mind. Its hills and streets were as forests of breathing statues amid glowing pictures.

And human hands first mimicked and then mocked,
With moulded limbs more lovely than its own,
The human form, till marble grew divine.

The artists, poets, orators and thinkers of that age have given models and laws to mankind. These prodigalities of successful genius were wedded to a frightful corruption of manners. Under the excess of extreme democracy public life was demoralized. Education was in the hands of the sophists who were the hirelings, not the lovers of wisdom, who gave more attention to words than to things, more attention to manner and pronunciation than to words. These quacks and wordsmen disregarded moral distinctions and debauched conscience. They desired knowledge not that they might know, but that they might be known, especially in the marts of lip-labour. For a handsome fee they taught the art of making the worse appear the better reason, and supplied unprincipled cleverness with the means of gratifying its ignoble ambitions. The priests cared nothing for the cure of souls, and their religion had no alliance with morality.

3. **Philosophy**. As Socrates left no writings behind him, his philosophy has been made out of what Xenophon and Plato have recorded of his actions, sayings and opinions. The unphilosophic Xenophon gives us only the *memorabilia*

of Socrates and his teaching, his aim being to describe the trial and death of his master, and defend him against his accusers. Plato, the *vates sacer* of Socrates, was a great poet and system-builder and gives us a highly colored photograph of the great sage. The Xenophontic Socrates inculcated in his conversation steady reverence for the invisible, as apart from, and over-riding the phenomena of sensible experience; but he interpreted the term in a religious sense, as signifying the agency of the personal gods, employed to produce effects beneficial or injurious to mankind. He also put forth his dialectic acuteness to prepare consistent and tenable definitions of familiar general terms at least so far as to make others feel, for the first time, that they did not understand these terms, though they had been always talking like persons that *did* understand. But the Platonic Socrates, a spokesman in the dialogues of Plato, enlarged both these discussions materially. But it is not definitely known how far the philosopher Plato's description of Socratic method and philosophy was his master's and how far it was colored by his own imagination. The two are, as Emerson says, "the double star which the most powerful instruments will not entirely separate." The third picture of Socrates was that executed by the comedian, Aristophanes. It was no picture, but a caricature of him. Hence our reliance is on Xenophon and Plato for a knowledge of Socrates and his philosophy. Thus reading between his disciples' accounts, we have derived his philosophy which forms an interesting epoch in the history of the human mind; and his intellectual characteristics through which he influenced the whole subsequent course of human thought may be stated under three heads:

(*a*) *Subject.* (*b*) *Method* (*c*) *Doctrine.*

(*a*) *As to subject. Man.* The son of Sophroniscus derided the more abstruse inquiries and metaphysical researches of his predecessors, and by first introducing moral philosophy, he induced mankind to consider themselves, their passions, their opinions, their duties, actions and faculties. Accordingly he was the first to proclaim that 'the proper study of mankind is man'; human nature, human duties and human happiness made up a field of really urgent and profitable inquiry. This signal revolu-

tion from the divine to the human. Cicero expressed metaphorically by the saying that 'Socrates brought down philosophy from the heavens to the earth.' He repudiated the speculations of philosophers, from Thales downward, as to the origin of all things out of water, fire, air, &c., and urged the thinkers to care for and dedicate themselves to the better management of *human* affairs. Practice or utility was with Socrates a cardinal point of his philosophy. "Do these inquirers" he asked "think that they already know *human* affairs well enough, that they thus begin to meddle with divine? Do they think that they shall be able to excite or calm the winds at pleasure, or have they no other view than to gratify an idle curiosity?" He considered it not only unprofitable but impious to attempt to comprehend that department. The gods, he thought, managed all those things after their fashion, and refused to submit them to invariable laws of sequence, such as men might discover by dint of study, the only means of knowledge permitted was religious sacrifice and prayer, and the consultation of the oracles. While this was the appointed way in reference to divine things, it was equally appointed that human things should be learned by diligence in study and investigation.

(*b*) *In regard to method*, Socrates insisted on accuracy in Definition and Classification. His mode will be seen in the statement of Xenophon. 'Socrates continued incessantly discussing *human* affairs, investigating.—What is piety? what is impiety? what is the honorable and the base? what is the just and the unjust? Men that knew these matters, he accounted good and honorable; men that were ignorant of them, he assimilated to slaves."

His investigation thus took the form of ascertaining the exact meaning—that is, the definition—of the leading terms in Ethics and in Politics, the settling of what J. S. Mill calls the *connotation* of a general term which determines how to apply it rightly to each individual case. Hence Aristotle's statement that Socrates was the first to introduce inductive reasoning and general definitions. The very idea of defining a general term, now so obvious, never seems to have suggested itself to any one previous to Socrates. (Herein lay the germ of the controversy

respecting universals and particulars which, since Plato, has developed into a mighty tree). And his manner of seeking out those definitions is also characteristic, and links itself to his conversational method, and his convicting men in general of ignorance in things that they thought they knew. Professing himself to be able to furnish no exact definition (this professed ignorance was called the Socratic irony) of justice, temperance, courage, &c., and finding every one else quite confident in their ability to supply the want, he asked some one to state his definition; and on its being given, he put a few further interrogations (as he said) by way of making sure that he understood the meaning, but with the speedy effect of driving the respondent into a humiliating self contradiction. In this manner, he demonstrated that the evils of life arose in great part from the wrong judgments of men, from their mistaking their own powers, presuming on their knowledge and ability and the truth of opinions adopted without enquiry. In brief, presumption of knowledge he despised and pressed for examination or scrutiny of the mind and its powers. This method, a sort of intellectual obstetricism, is most fully exemplified in certain of the Platonic dialogues as the first *Alcibiades*, *Laches*, *Charmides*, *Euthyphron*, *&c*. According to Xenophon, he could pass from his severe cross-examining method, with its humiliating shock of convicted ignorance and address to his hearers plain and homely precepts, inculcating self-control, temperance, piety, duty to parents brotherly love, fidelity in friendship, diligence, &c.,—such direct admonitory influence being common to him with the so called Sophists.[12] The Sophists held that sensation, appetite and desire, that these alone, were the only indefeasible principles of our nature. But Socrates main-

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[12] Protagoras, Gorgias and Prodicus were three of the most celebrated Sophists in the Age of Pericles when Athens was at the height of her glory. The Sophists called for free inquiry in which Socrates agreed with them, but he demanded further that that inquiry should be thorough going and complete, more thorough going and complete, than it had been under the management of the Sophists. This then was the preliminary ground on which Socrates opposed the Sophists. *Their* enquiry into the nature of man he held had been partial, inadequate and superficial; *his* professed to be more radical, more searching and more comprehensive.

tained that *thought*, and not *sensation*, is man's peculiar characteristic, his essential property, and therefore exhorted men 'to limit their external wants, to be sparing in indulgence, and to cultivate, even in preference to honors and advancement, the pleasures arising from a performance of duty, as well as from self-examination and the consciousness of internal improvement.'

In short, the Socratic Method has two sides, the one *negative* and the other *positive.* (1) The *Negative* one is what is known as the *socratic irony.* Making believe to be ignorant, namely, and seeming to elicit information from those with whom he conversed, the philosopher would unexpectedly turn the tables on his seeming instructors and confound their supposed knowledge, as well by the unlooked for consequences which he educed by his incessant questions as by the glaring contradictions in which they were in the end by their own admissions landed. Thus their supposed knowlege brought about its own refutation (2). The *positive* side of the Socratic method is the *maiélitic* or obstetric art. Socrates likened himself to his mother who was a midwife, because, if no longer able to bear thoughts himself, he was still quite able to help others to bear them as well as to distinguish those that were sound from those that were unsound. The philosopher by means of his incessant questioning and the resultant disentanglement of ideas possessed the art of eliciting from him with whom he conversed a new and previously unknown thought and so of helping to a birth his intellectual throes.

(c) *As regards Doctrine*, Socrates was distinguished chiefly by his theory of virtue. Virtue, he said, consisted in knowledge[13]. To do right was the only road to happiness; and as every man sought to be happy, vice could arise only from ignorance or mistake as to the means; hence the proper corrective was an enlarged teaching of the consequences of actions.

This view of virtue, to most modern minds, would seem incompatible with moral freedom; but to Socrates it appeared, on the contrary, that knowledge alone could

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[13] Moral insight, the discovery of permenent as opposed to changing attributes.

really make men free. Only good conduct he maintained, is truly voluntary; a bad man is constrained by ignorance to do what is contrary to his real wish, which is always for his own greatest good; only knowledge can set him free to realise his wish.

In judging Socrates as a moralist, it must be premised that he was the pioneer who planted the first flag on the continent of practical Ethics. Professor Blackie calls him 'the father of moral science.' He never identified virtue with knowledge as at present understood but meant by it wisdom. This is corroborated by the fact that his exhortations were addressed to men's feelings or sentiments as well as to their intellect. Hence it stands to reason that Socrates advocated the development and perfection of both the intellect and the emotions so that virtue may be perfect. In other words, as knowledge of our true nature approaches to perfection virtue grows and perfects itself. Hence if a man is true to his nature, *knows himself*, he cannot be vicious. Vice, according to Socrates, consists in ignorance of our true nature, (viz., that thought is *free* and *active* and transcends sensation, is free from the yoke of sensation, passion and desire). Therefore man's proper happiness, his *supreme good* or chief end, is to be found in a due subjugation of our appetites and desires and not in their unqualified indulgence, as is inculcated by those moralists who do not know what the true and essential nature of man is. Viewed in this manner, virtue and happiness are identical in effect, both being the result of the subjugation of man's animal propensities. Socrates, to be sure, never *showed* them identical but used the term *good* ambiguously to denote either virtue or happiness, and this ambiguity led to the rise of the opposite schools the Cryrenaics and the Cynics. The former chose the alternative which placed the good or chief end of man in happiness; the latter, that which placed the good or chief end of man in virtue. The Cyrenaics inculcated, as man's chief good, an indulgence, *in so far as prudence permitted*, in sensual gratifications; the Cynics, on the other hand, inculcated, as man's chief good, an abnegation, *in so far as nature allowed*, of all such gratifications. These counter opinions first expressed by Aristippus and Antisthenes

respectively came out more fully afterwards in the systems of the Epicureans and the Stoics. Of course these two systems are extreme in their nature. Self-indulgence and self-restraint stand at opposite poles. But measure is medicine. A moderate use of both helps us not only to live but to live healthily. Is it not a fact that a man *to be happy* must first *be ?* How can one attain *happiness* if one murders his existence, destroys his rationality, the health and virtue of the soul. ?

4. **Socrates and his Dæmon**. Socrates declared that he was accompanied by a dæmon or invisible conductor whose frequent interposition stopped him from the commission of evil, and the guilt of misconduct though it never impelled him to act. This familiar spirit, however, according to some, was nothing more than a sound judgment assisted by prudence and long experience, which warned him at the approach of danger, and, from a general speculation of mankind, could foresee what success would attend an enterprise or what calamities would follow an ill-managed administration. Does not this dæmon of Socrates typify conscience [14] educated and enlightened by experience whose utterances are prophetic and imperative ?

5. **His Idea of God**.—It was Socrates who naturalized the true idea of Design and gave it currency among men. The highest truth with him is not something, but some one. He holds that the world proved the existence

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[14] *Zeller* says that the divine sign is 'the general form which a vivid, but in its origin unexplained, sense of the propriety of a particular action assumed for the personal consciousness of Socrates,' 'the inner voice of individual tact,' cultivated to a pitch of extraordinary accuracy.

Xenophon believes 'that it was a quick exercise of a judgment, informed by knowledge of the subject, trained by experience, and inferring from cause to effect without consciousness of the process.

Schleiermacher opines that it 'denotes the province of such rapid moral judgments as cannot be referred to distinct grounds, which accordingly Socrates did not attribute to his proper self : for instance, presentiment of the issue of an under-taking : attraction or repulsion in reference to particular individnals.'

F. J. Church writes 'that it was not conscience, for it dealt not with the morality, but with the expediency of actions. Besides, conscience is positive as well as negative, and Socrates could hardly claim a monopoly of it.'

and wisdom of the supreme world-builder and that every part of his work bears the stamp of his intelligence, just as thunder and wind, these servants of the gods, though invisible, are known by their effects. All created things have for him one centre and one plan. In every thing he finds a thought. He could not believe that man is for man the measure of the universe. He introduces the fruitful idea of a controlling spirit, and maintains that the laws of nature agree with the laws of our thought. Amid the numberless opposing gods of Greece, his soul findsunity and repose in the idea of one supreme God.

6. **His Contribution to Philosophy.**

The services which Socrates has rendered to philosophy are *two fold ;* negative and positive. *Negative*, in as much as he avoided all vain discussions; combated mere speculative reasoning on substantial grounds; and had the wisdom to acknowledge ignorance when necessary; but without attempting to determine accurately what is capable, and what is not, of being accurately known. *Positive*, inasmuch as he examined with great ability the ground directly submitted to our understanding, and of which man is the centre; without, however, any profound investigation of the different ideas and motives which influence practice. He first distinguished that Free-Will and Nature were both under the dominion of certain laws; pointed out the proper sources of all knowledge; and finally laid open new subjects for philosophic research.'

His conception of philosophy was as follows. Human wisdom is patch-work; the gods have reserved what is greatest to themselves. The wisdom of Socrates was the consciousness of not knowing, and not the consciousness of a positive gradual approximation to the knowledge of truth. Philosophy is a study of death; the philosopher longs to be emancipated from the bondage of the body which is a perpetual hindrance to the soul in her pursuit of truth. True virtue is a purification of the soul, and those who have purified their souls will be with the gods after death. Therefore, Socrates is ready to die.

7. **Defects of Socrates and his age.**

Nationality was his highest thought. All his sy

pathies were limited by the state. He had not the remotest idea of anything that makes the whole world kin. Great discoverer of truth though he was, the Columbus in the region of Ethics, he did not discover in mankind the marks of a kindred race or common mould. He had no idea of bringing the whole world into neighbourhood, far less into brotherhood. He believed that men are earth-born, not heaven-born. He was no representative of the spirit and service of humanity. He shared the popular scorn of barbarians, that is, of all who were not Greeks. He never suggested the abolition of slavery which he regarded as an institution ordained by nature. He shared the Greek contempt for women and regarded a wife as an indispensable Evil. In his eyes vice lost all its evil by losing its extravagance and grossness. With him it was a disgrace to forgive an injury, and to kill an enemy was no murder. These facts give some color to Young's harsh words,—

> As wise as Socrates, might justly stand
> The definition of a modern fool.

PLATO.

The Platonic system is the objectivised Socrates, the conciliation and fusion of all previous philosophy, the first type and pattern of all higher speculation, of all metaphysical as of all ethical idealism. —*Ueberweg*.

1. **Life (B. C. 429 or 428—347)**. Plato's original name was Aristocles and he was called Plato from the breadth of either his brow or his shoulders. The son of Ariston and Perictione, he was on his paternal side a descendant of Codrus and on his maternal side connected with Solon. He was instructed in grammar, music, and gymnastics by the most distinguished teachers of that time; and his mind was cultivated and enlightened by the study of poetry and of geometry, from which he derived that acuteness of judgment and warmth of imagination which have stamped his character as the most subtle and flowery writer of antiquity. He first began his literary career by writing poems and tragedies; but he was soon disgusted with his own productions, when, at the age of twenty, he became a follower of Socrates and one of his most ardent admirers. Seeing that his earlier effusions

could not command public attention, he committed them to the flames and continued a pupil of Socrates for eight years. When Socrates died in B. C. 399, Plato retired from Athens and began to travel over Greece. He visited Megara, Thebes and Elis, and subsequently Magna Græcia, attracted by the fame of the Pythagorean philosophy, and by the learning, abilities and reputation of its professors, Philolaus, Archytas and Eurytus. Then he arrived at Egypt where the mathematician Theodorus flourished and where he knew that the tenets of the Pythagorean philosophy and metempsychosis had been fostered and cherished. During his residence in Sicily, he became acquainted with the elder Dionysius, but soon fell out with the tyrant. When he had finished his travels, Plato retired to the groves of Academus in the neighbourhood of Athens whence his school was subsequently called the Academic. During forty years, he presided at the head of the academy, and there he devoted his time to the instruction of his pupils, and composed those dialogues which have been the admiration of every age and country. His occupation as an instructor was twice interrupted by his voyages to Sicily; first when Dion[1] persuaded him to try to win the younger Dionysius to philosophy; the second time, a few years later, when the invitation of Dionysius to reconcile the disputes which had broken out between him and Dion brought him back to Syracuse. His efforts were both times unsuccessful; for, though rich in humor and irony, he did not share the fine geniality of Socrates, and the melancholic Plato owed his own safety to nothing but the earnest intercession of Archytas. He lived to the age of 82 when the visions of his youth had fled; he was never married; philosophy was the only bride of his heart. And he must have possessed some independent property, as he expresses himself strongly against teaching philosophy for fees, and we nowhere read of his having held any public office from which he could have derived emolument. Further, he is said to have endowed the academy with his patrimony.

2. **His Works.**—The works of Plato are numerous;

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[1] The kinsman and prime-minister of Dionysius, the tyrant of Sicily.

they are all written in the form of a dialogue (model of excellence for the rare union of a poetic and philosophic spirit) except twelve letters. He speaks always by the mouth of others, and the philosopher has nowhere made mention of himself except once in his dialogue intitled *Phædon*, and another time in his *Apology for Socrates*. His writings were so celebrated, and, his opinions so respected, that he was called *divine* ; and for the elegance, melody, and sweetness of his expressions, he was distinguished by the appellation of the *Athenian Bee*. Quintilian said that when he read Plato, he seemed to hear not a man, but a *divinity* speaking. The dialogues which are the only incontestible authorities respecting his opinions deal respectively with the three branches, *dialectic*, *ethics*, and *physics*.

Dialectic shows itself in (1) the Meno, (2) the Theætetus, (3) the Sophista, (4) the Parmenides, (5) the Philebus, (6) the Phædo, (7) the Republic.

Ethics are treated of principally in (1) the Philebus and (2) the Republic to which may be added (3) the Euthyphro.

The *Physics* are contained for the most part in the Timæus. From this enumeration, it will be perceived that Dialectic and Ethics are sometimes treated of in the same Dialogue.

3. **His Philosophy.**—The speculative mind of Plato was employed in examining things divine and human, and he attempted to fix and ascertain, not only the practical doctrine of *morals* and *politics*, but the more subtle and abstruse theory of mystical *theogony*. In his system of philosophy he followed the *metaphysical* opinions of *Pythagoras*, the *morals* of *Socrates*, and the *physics* of *Heraclitus*. Before discussing the philosophy of Plato, let us see what the errors and oversights are, which it was designed to correct, and supplement. Upheld by the ability of the Sophists, sensationalism was the dominant system, as it was the prevailing error of the time, and, accordingly, it was against sensationalism and its conclusions that the philosophy of Plato was directed. It showed how impotent the senses are without the aid of the intellect; and Platonism, in its general

character, tended to rectify the inadvertencies incident to natural or ordinary thinking, and the aberrations into which the system of the Sophists had run. Thus the distinctive character of the Platonic philosophy is expressed by the word *idealism*, the capacity of forming and using ideas being taken as an essential virtue or quality of mind as contrasted with matter; of thought as contrasted with sensation; of the internal forces of individuals and of the universe, as contrasted with the external forms by which these forces are manifested. As such, the ideal philosophy stands generally opposed to that kind of mental action which draws its stores principally from without, and is not strongly determined to mould the materials thus received by any type of thought or hue of emotion derived from within. In other words, the philosophy of Plato is essentially a *poetical* and an *artistical* philosophy; for poetry, painting, and music all grow out of idealism, or those lofty inborn conceptions by which genius is distinguished from talent. It is also a *scientific* philosophy, for the purest science, as mathematics—on which Plato is well known to have placed the highest value—is a science of mere ideas or forms conditioned by the intellect which deduces their laws; and above all, it is essentially a *moral* and a *theological* philosophy, for practice or action is the highest aim of man, and morality is the ideal of action; and God, as cause of all, is the ideal of ideals, the supreme power, virtue and excellence to which all contemplation recurs, and from which all action and original energy proceed.

(*a*) *Dialectic*.—Socrates had explained that only the knowledge of concepts guarantees a true knowledge. Plato, at once the continuator and supplementer of the philosophy of Socrates, went further, and maintained that it was only by reflection in concepts, in the forms of things or *ideas* that true and original Being could be attained. The word, *Dialectic*, from *dialegomai*, originally signifies only conversational discussion; thence that discussion conducted in such scientific fashion as to lead to reliable results, *i.e.*, strictly logical. The product of dialectics is *ideas*, and these ideas being the *éidê*, forms or types of things which are common to all the individuals of a species, all the species of a genus, all the genera of a

family, and all the families of a class, generate classification—that is, knowledge of the permanent in phenomena —and definition which is merely the articulate verbal expression of this permanency. The construction of the confused results of observation into the orderly array of clear conceptions by a sort of cross-examination of the phenomena, performed by minds impassioned for truth, is exhibited as the great characteristic of the teaching of Socrates, in the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon. In the dialogues of Plato, the same purification of the reason, so to speak, from the clouds of indistinct sensuousness, is exhibited on a higher platform, and with more comprehensive results. For between Socrates and Plato, notwithstanding a deep internal identity, there was this striking difference in outward attitude—that the one used *logic* as a practical instrument in the hands of a great missionary and preacher of virtue; while the other used it as the architect of a great intellectual system of the universe.

(i) The *Doctrine of Ideas* is the kernel of Platonism, Plato made a grand distinction between the *intelligible*, or what occupied the intellect, and the *sensible;* the one represented the eternal, the immutable, and the certain; the other, the mutable and fleeting part of the universe. The *forms* preceded the *matter;* the actual circles occurring in nature were produced from a pre-existing ideal circle holding a place in the Divine intelligence; the actual men were generated from an ideal man. In fact, Plato insisted on Ideas as the Real Entia prior both in time and in logical order to the transient objects of sight and touch, and serving as an exemplar to which these latter are made to approximate imperfectly.[3]

The Realistic Ontology of Plato is founded upon *mistrust* and *contempt* of perception of *sense*, as bearing entirely on the (Heraclitean) flux of particulars, which never stand still so as to become objects of knowledge. All reality and all cognoscibility were supposed to reside in the separate world of cogitable universals of which, in some confused manner, particulars were supposed to partake. The universal, apart from its particulars, was clearly and fully knowable, furnishing propositions con-

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[3] *C. f.* The Allegory of the Cave in the beginning of Plato's Republic, Bk. vii.

stantly and infallibly true: the universal, as manifested in its particulars, was never fully knowable, nor could ever become the subject of propositions, except such as were sometimes true and sometimes false.

(ii) *Innate Ideas.*—Socrates held that the seeds of all rational knowledge pre-existed in the mind, that they might be drawn forth into full growth and development from within but could not be imparted to us from without. Plato held, with Socrates, that the true art of education consisted in educing from the pupil's own mind its own native treasures, by stimulating his reflective capacities. How had the pupil's mind its treasures antecedent to experience? Man, before his birth into earth, lived with God and shared His Ideas, and on earth he should ever strive to regain his long-lost patrimony of truth. Fallen though he be, his spirit is still the intellectual kinsman of God, and can think and feel congenially with the Parent mind. In our first estate, our mind knew truth not at second hand but at first hand, not by Representation but by Presentation. But, in this poor world, the soul has received some mysterious injury, yet its impressions of truth, though overlaid, are not utterly destroyed but revive under favorable circumstances through the imperfect copies of ideas in the world of sense. Like moss-covered inscriptions, like the royal superscription upon the battered coin, they may, with patience, be relieved and read off. Elizabeth B. Browning writes platonically :—

Let who says
The soul's a clean white paper[3] rather say,
A palimpsest,[4] a prophet's holograph[5],
Defiled, erased, and covered by a monk's.
.... poring on which
.... we may discern perhaps
Some fair, fine trace of what was written once,
Some upstroke of an alpha and omega,
Expressing the old Scripture.

Knowledge and virtue spring from *Reminiscence*, and

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[3] The mind regarded as a *tabula rasa* by the Sophists and the Lockian school.

[4] A manuscript which has been written upon twice, the first writing having been erased to make place for the second.

[5] Any writing wholly in the handwriting of the person from whom it proceeds or who bestows by means of it.

our highest attainment is not cognition but re-cognition. Hence true knowledge is not brought to, but drawn out of us, and the years bring the lover of wisdom, a slow remembrance of the glories of the heavenly kingdom.

> Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting,
> Not in entire forgetfulness
> And not in utter nakedness,
> But trailing clouds of glory do we come
> From God, who is our home.

To sum up. The chief characteristics of the Platonic ideas are their *necessity*, and their *universality*, their *objectivity*, their *innateness*, their *reality*, and their *power of giving unity to our multifarious cognitions.*

(*b*) *Ethics.*—The theory of knowledge and the nature of ideas were undertaken mainly that a system of eternal divine types, as the only reliable knowledge, might serve as a foundation for a virtuous life, as the only consistent course of action. Virtue with Socrates and Plato was only practical reason. As in the Proverbs of Solomon, all vice is folly, so in the philosophy of Plato, the imperial virtue was *phronesis*, wisdom or practical insight. The other two great Greek and Platonic virtues, *sophrosyne*, moderation or sound-mindedness and *dikaiosyne*, justice [or the assigning to every act and every function its proper place—were equally exemplifications of a reasonable order applied to action. In the Republic,[6] Plato refers to four cardinal virtues (of which Benevolence is not one) corresponding to his trifurcation of the soul and the harmony of the three faculties composing it.

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6 The *Republic*, the greatest of Plato's works and the longest but one. It was written in his old age, to show what kind of a state his philosophy would produce. Its gorgeous images of prosperity and perfection were suggested by the decay of Greece. The State is just the man 'writ large'. The idea of the good creates the state in little, that is man, and the State in great, that is, society. *His ideal Republic is a church rather than a State.* (Baron Bunsen) and, in some respects, resembles the Old Testament theocracy. The same subject occupies his pen in *The Laws*, his last and longest work.

Analogy between Soul & State.



The *concupiscible* faculty is the *faculty* of desire or appetite and corresponds to the quæstuary or chrematistic or artisan class in the state. Just as this class aims at the attainment of wealth, so does that faculty pursue pleasure as its end.

The *Irascible faculty* comprises the more heroic principles and impulses of our nature; and it corresponds to the military or auxiliary order in the state. Just as the military are called in to aid the legislative authority in putting down mob insurrections, so the irascible faculty *i.e.*, the nobler passions, and the reason, unite in resisting the solicitations of the lower appetites.

The *Rational faculty* in Greek, *Nous*, is the governing principle in the mind just as the legislative is the governing power in the State. It is the faculty of discerning Right.

Justice.—When consent and harmony prevail among the three faculties, then that complete virtue which Plato called *Justice* arises. And this virtue is higher than temperance, fortitude, wisdom, each taken by itself, since it is the complement of all three. Happiness is attainable only through Justice or Virtue. Justice is declared to be happiness first in itself, and secondly, in its consequences. The highest happiness of man is the pursuit of truth or philosophy.

(i) *The Good.*—Good is a compound of Pleasure

and intelligence, the latter predominating. Pleasure is the indeterminate requiring the determinate 'knowledge' to regulate it. The mixture of pleasure and intelligence is to be adjusted by the all important principle of Measure or Proportion which connects the Good with the Beautiful. The highest good is the being made like to God; and this is effected by that yearning after the Ideal which we know by the name of Love. One writer acutely remarks thal Plato fails to distinguish between the *good* and the *right*; the good being the character of things, and the right, a quality of actions. It is worthwhile noting that the Greek word oftenest used in the New Testament for the *good*, and also for the *honest*, means literally the *beautiful*. The same idea is under the word *grace* and its derivatives *graceful* and the *graces*. Plato sometimes identified the Good that Socrates sought with the very Divine Being and thus made one the ultimate notions of Ethics and Ontology; and, in this fusion, he was probably anticipated by Euclides of Megara who held that the one real being is "that which we call by many names, Good, Wisdom, Reason or God."

(ii) *Love*, with Plato, is the bond of union between man and God, a transcendental admiration of excellence, an admiration of which the soul is capable by its own high origination and the germs of god-like excellence, which are implanted into it from above. The Philosophy of Love is set forth with imaginative grandeur in the *Phædrus*, and with rich dramatic variety in the *Banquet* of which dialogue there is an English translation by Shelley.

(iii) *Beauty*. With Plato, the foundation of beauty is a reasonable order, addressed to the imagination through the senses—*i. e.*, symmetry in form and harmony in sounds, the principles of which are as certain as the laws of logic, mathematics and morals—all equally necessary products of eternal intellect, acting by the creation and by the comprehension of well-ordered forms, and well harmonised forces, in rich and various play through the living frame of the universe.

(iv) *Theology*.—The True, the Beautiful and the Good, are not three but one with Plato. His theology is of his own invention and adapted to his ethical theory. The gods he represents as the authors of the good, and

the Supreme Good he identifies with God. He is the author and executor or guardian of the laws of morals. He is the fountain of all force and the creator of all order in the universe. From this supreme and all-excellent intelligence, human souls are offshoots, emanations or sparks in such a fashion that they partake essentially of the essential nature of the source from which they proceed, and, accordingly, possess *Unity* as their most characteristic quality, attest their presence everywhere by a unifying force which acts by impressing a type on whatever materials are submitted to it, and is filled with a native joy in the perception of such types, the product of some divine principle of unity, wheresoever presented. To the just man death is gain, and his blessedness is described in glowing terms. He cherishes the hope of reunion with the good in the realms of eternal purity.

(v) *Immortality of the Soul.*—As touching the Hereafter, Plato furnishes a good handbook of Natural Religion. With great confidence he insists on the immortality of the soul, though many of his arguments are vain. Indeed, he comes near claiming two eternities for the soul, the one before and the other after the human birth. He emphasizes the close connection between this life and the next, the solemn judgment to come, the unspeakable reward of the righteous, and the punishment of the wicked.

Plato considered the soul to be a self acting energy; and, viewed as combined with the body, he distinguished in it two parts, the *rational* and the *irrational* or *animal*, mutually connected by a sort of middle term. The animal part has its orgin in the imprisonment of the soul in the body; the intellectualstill retains a consciousness of the *Ideas*, whereby it is capable of returning to the happy condition of spirits.

> Though inland far we be,
> Our souls have sight of that immortal sea
> Which brought us hither;
> Can in a moment travel thither—
> And see the children sport upon the spore,
> And hear the mighty waters rolling evermore.

In the *Phædrus* he likens the soul to a charioteer with a pair of winged steeds, the one black and mortal, the other white and immortal. By faith and love the

immortal steed is plumed to fly into the higher world, its true home, but the mortal droops her wings and is dragged upon the earth. The one is a noble animal who is guided by word and admonition only, but the other is an ill-looking villain, who will hardly yield to blow and spur. He rushes towards the earth and a fearful contest ensues. The charioteer uses bit and bridle with all his might, covers the black horse's tongue and jaws with blood, and forces him to rest his haunches upon the ground. Only thus can he be tamed and humbled. Plato writes as if he had many a personal injury to avenge on the villain. The horse of nobler breed, nourished on nectar and ambrosia, turns its head to the pastures of immortal truth and beauty, and strives to check the downward fury of its mate. With such a pair in hand the charioteer is just able to raise his head and catch a glimpse of the 'true above' upon which the gods gaze without let or hindrance. This glimpse is granted only to a few souls out of the many, only to the purest in their purest moments, and it infuses new life into the spirit. But some are carried downwards by the plunging of the unruly horse, or lamed by unskilful driving, and often the wings droop or are broken, and the soul, failing to see the light, sinks to the earth beneath the load of forgetfulness and vice. He thus does equal justice to the individuality and duality of man, and admirably represents the inner discord and self-disunion which conscience reveals, and the difficulty of attaining unto virtue.

In the *Phædrus*, the doctrine is founded on the nature of the soul, as the self-moving principle of all motion; in the *Republic*, on the fact that the life of the soul is not destroyed by moral badness which yet, as the natural evil and enemy of the soul, ought, if anything could effect this, to effect its destruction; in the *Timæus*, on the goodness of God who notwithstanding that the nature of the soul as a generated essence subjects it to the possibility of destruction, cannot will that what has been put together in so beautiful a manner should again be dissolved; in the *Phædo*, finally, this doctrine is supported, partly by an argument drawn from the nature of the subjective activity of the philosopher whose striving after knowledge involves the desire for incorporeal

existence, *i.e.*, the desire to die, and partly on a series of objective arguments.

(vi) *Politics.*—The first condition of every sound polity is the rule of the philosopher. This rule must be absolute and can only be entrusted to the few who are capable of it, for philosophy is not a matter for the multitude. The constitution of the Platonic state is therefore an aristocracy, the absolute rule of the competent persons or philosophers restrained by no law. The state takes care that the citizens shall be begotten by the best parents under the most favorable circumstances and their education and well-being are properly attended to. In this ideal state, the civil magistrate who is a philosopher, as in Hobbes, supplies the ethical sanction. All virtue is an affair of the state, a political institution. Grote says that his latest utterances (in the *Laws*) are 'imbued with the persecuting spirit of mediæval catholicism' and Lewes condemns them with greater severity. His sun was not largest at its setting, nor did it 'glorify the retinue of clouds around it.'

(*c*) *Physics.*—Physical science in the days of Plato stood on no basis sufficiently sure or broad to authorise a philosophy of the material universe with any prospect of success. Nevertheless, in his *Timœus*, the great philosopher of ideas has attempted this. The great question as to what matter is, and whence, Plato nowhere seems to settle very clearly; but the general tendency of ancient thought was towards a Dualism which recognised the existence of a not very tractable element called *matter* in which Plato seems to have acquiesced. There are two views of sensible objects. According to one, they are copies of ideas eternal and immutable which are their patterns. This view is monistic. The other view is dualistic and presents ideas and things as separate entities. The question is whether the idea can exist apart from the object. If it can, what is the intermediary that links the idea and the corporeal? In *Timœus*, Plato says that the *soul* stands midway between ideas and the corporeal world and unites both, but Aristotle gives *form* as the connecting link between idea and phenomenon.

(i) *Cosmology.*—God begins his work of creation by constructing the world-soul out of the two elements before him, the immutable harmonious Ideals and chang-

ing discordant Matter. This soul he infuses into the mass of matter, which thereupon crystallizes into the geometrical forms of the four elements, and assumes the shape of a perfect square rotating on its axis. The cosmos thus created is divine, imperishable and infinitely beautiful. Further, each element is to have living creatures belonging to it. Those belonging to the elements of fire are the Gods, both the heavenly bodies and those of whom tradition tells us. All these were fashioned by the Divine Architect himself, but the creatures belonging to the other elements, including the mortal part of man, were the work of the created gods. The immortal part of man, the reason, is of like substance with the soul of the world, and was distributed by the Demiurgus amongst the stars till the time came for each several particle to enter the body prepared for it by the created gods, when it combined with two other ingredients, the appetitive and the spirited which it had to bring into subjection. If it succeeded, it returned to its star on the death of the body; if it failed, it was destined to undergo various transmigrations until its victory was complete. In all these physical speculations, Plato was much influenced by the Pythagoreans—(Refer to Zeller's Outlines of Greek Philosophy for fuller information on the point.)

4. Aristotle's Chief Objections Against Plato's Realism.

1. Realism is a useless multiplication of existences, serving no purpose.

2. Plato's arguments in support of it are either inconclusive or prove too much; for *cognition* does not require the *universalia extra rem* as the *universalia in re*, the constant predicate of all the particulars, is sufficient as an object of cognition.

3. Particulars participate in the universal. If the Form of the universals and the Form of those particulars that participate in the Universals, be the same, we shall have something common to both the one and the other, so that the objection called the *Third Man* will become applicable, and a higher Form must be postulated. But if the Form of the universals and the Form of the participating particulars be not identical, then the same name as signifying both will be used equivocally.

4. If the Universals or Forms are Numbers, how can they ever be causes? Even if we suppose particulars to be Numbers also, how can one set of Numbers be causes to the others?

5. The Academy. We turn back to trace the fortunes of the Academy, which may be conveniently divided into *three schools:*

(i) *The Old.* To this belong the names

Speusippus
Xenocrates
Polemo } B. C. 347—270.
Heraclides of Pontus.
Crantor.
Crates.

These appear to have modified the Platonic doctrines mainly by the admixture of Pythagorean elements.

(ii) *The Middle or Sceptical.*

1. *Arcesilaus*, its founder who by his dialectic quibbling changed Platonism into Pyrrhonism.
2. *Carneades* of Cyrene.
3. *Clitomachus* of Carthage.

They neglected the positive doctrine of Plato and employed themselves mainly in a negative polemic against the dogmatism of the Stoics, professing to follow the example of Socrates, though they thought that even he had approached too near to dogmatism in saying that he *knew* that he knew nothing.

(iii) *The Reformed or Eclectic.* commenced with [1] *Philo* of Larissa, a pupil of Clitomachus and one of Cicero's teachers.

[2] *Antiochus*, Philo's pupil who endeavoured to strengthen the Academy by uniting Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines with the original Platonism.

4. **Conclusion.**—Plato carried on the work of his master, Socrates, with a deeper and more comprehensive intelligence. He developed the Socratic philosophy of concepts, which he supplemented by all the kindred elements of pre-Socratic doctrines, to its metaphysical consequences, and regarded every thing from this point of view. In this manner he created a grand system of an idealistic nature, the central point of which lies on the one side in

the intuition of ideas, on the other in inquiries about the nature and duty of man. Aristotle supplemented this by the most vigorous researches into nature. While controverting the dualistic harshness of the Platonic idealism, he held closely to the leading principles, and by extending them so widely that they seemed adapted to embrace the entire world of reality, he brought the Socratic philosophy of concepts to the highest scientific completeness.

Plato's philosophy is a privilege for the few, not an inheritance for all; his salvation was aristocratic. He did not insist on duty and the right but wandered among the verities. He confounded sin with physical evil. None but those that would contemplate *ideas* could be men of virtue. He slighted the heart and over-estimated the head, believing that intellect is "the king of heaven and earth." He was not interested in the elevation of woman and pleaded for a community of wives. In the soul of the slave he believed that something was radically wanting and that, hence, on his nature no nurture could stick. He preached a caste religion, never dreaming of a spiritual democracy, or, to borrow a new phrase, a theo-democracy. He honored Hellenic rather than human nature.[6]

QUESTIONS.

SOCRATES.

1. Who were the Sophists and in what relation did Socrates stand to them?
2. Describe the Socratic method of teaching.
3. 'To Socrates' says Aristotle 'we may unquestionably assign two novelties.' Name them and illustrate both.
4. Explain 'Negative Dialectic' and state its advantages.
5. What claims had Socrates for the title 'the Reformer of heathendom'?
6. How did Socrates come at the idea of God? Was he a Monotheist or Polytheist? Assign reasons.

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[6] 'Mankind is a word that never passed the lips of Socrates Plato or Aristotle.'—Müller's Chips, vol. ii. p. 5.

7. In what sense is the charge against Socrates of having corrupted the Athenian youth, true or justifiable ?
8. Criticize :—'Virtue consists in knowledge.'
9. 'Bentham, Mill and their school have claimed Socrates as an Utilitarian, but *without justice*.' Examine this statement.
10. What was his argument for immortality ?
11. How are the Cynics and Cyrenaics *one-sided* or *imperfect* Socratists ?
12. Trace the influence of the age of Pericles on the doctrine and method of Socrates.
13. What, according to Socrates, decided right and wrong in actions ?
14. Explain *Socratic irony* and give an example of it.
15. How do the accounts of Socrates given by Plato, Xenophon and Aristophanes respectively differ ?
16. Substantiate Dr. Bain's statement that the controversy of Nominalism and Realism begins in the colloquies of Socrates.

Plato.

1. Explain the appropriateness of the epithet *divine* for Plato and why he was called the *Athenian Bee* and Poet-Sage.
2. Account for the failure of his missions to Sicily and describe how that failure influenced his philosophy.
3. To what circumstance of Plato's life does Carlyle allude when he defined him 'as a gentleman very much at ease in Zion ?'
4 Explain fully the statement that 'Platonism is a mighty tree which springs from a *two-lobed seed*.'
5. In what two senses does Plato use *Ideas ?* Bring out Coleridge's meaning when he speaks of them 'as a plank from the wreck of paradise.'
6. How does Plato account for Sin ?
7. Explain Plato's doctrine of *Reminiscence*.'
8. Sketch his arguments for immortality.
9. 'The notion of *absolute creation*' says Brandis, 'is unknown to Plato, as it is to all Grecian and Roman antiquity.' Explain.

10. How does Plato define Virtue? Enumerate and explain his Cardinal Virtues.
11. Describe Plato's *kosmos.*
12. Explain Plato's theory of the origin of knowledge.
13. In what relation, according to Plato, does Ethics stand to Politics and Religion?
14. Explain and criticise Plato's Dualism.
15. Plato laid the philosophical foundation for Asceticism and Monkery.' Show how.
16 Ackerman says, 'Platonism has a *saving purpose*, Christianity a saving power.' Explain.
17. 'The Platonic Philosophy is at once the *continuation* and the *supplement* of the philosophy of Socrates.' Explain.
18. What are the *four* distinct views * embraced in the Theory of Ideas as it is developed by Plato?

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1. * Strictly Platoni-c in-its connection with logical science (Dialectic).
2. That in which it sums up and measures the infinities of the sensible world.
3. A Philosophy of being in opposition to the mere knowledge of sensible phenomena.
4. Its aspect as a theory of the universe.

The Platonic Idea is the pure archetypal essence, in which those things which are together subsumed under the same concept, participate. *Aesthetically and ethically*, it is the perfect in its kind, to which the given reality remains perpetually inferior. *Logically and ontologically* considered, it is the object of the concept. As the objects of the outer world are severally known through corresponding mental representations, so the *idea* is known through the concept. The Idea is not the essence immanent in the various similar individual objects as such, but rather this essence conceived as perfect in its kind, immutable, unique and independent or existing, *per se.* The idea respects the universal; but it is also represented by Plato as a spaceless and timeless archetype of individuals. The idea is the archetype, individual objects are images of this. Independent singular existence was attributed to the Ideas, and even movement, life, animation and reason were said to belong to them. Plato assumed a plurality of Ideas and held that the highest Idea is the Idea of the Good.—*Ueberweg.*

19. Explain clearly Plato's theory of Beauty *

20. Give a brief sketch of the Academy founded by Plato.

21. Distinguish between Plato's Intellection and Opinion.

N. B. Intellection is of the universals and Opinion of sensibles; Intellection, the privilege only of Gods and of a small section of mankind and opinion may belong to any man; Intellection unshakeable by persuasion, but opinion though communicated by persuasion, is easily removable by counter persuasion.

22. Criticise Plato's ideas regarded as Numbers.

N.B.—The idea of Number is relative and the Relative can never be prior to the absolute or self-existent.

23. State clearly Aristotle's objections against Plato's Realism.

24. Explain *soul*, *matter*, and *world-soul* as understood by Plato.

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* In the dialogue of Plato, called *Hippias Major*, there is a discussion on the Beautiful. Various theories are propounded and to all of them objections, supposed insuperable, are made by the Platonic Socrates. *First*. The suitable or the becoming is said to constitute beauty. To this it is objected that the suitable or becoming, is what causes objects to *appear* beautiful, not what makes them really beautiful. *Secondly*. The Useful or Profitable. Power, which when employed for useful purposes is beautiful, may be employed for evil and cannot be beautiful. If for *power* be substituted *power employed for good*, the good and the beautiful are made cause and effect, and therefore different things which is absurd. *Thirdly*. The beautiful is a particular variety of the agreeable or pleasurable, being all those things that give pleasure through *sight* and *hearing*. Socrates demands why these pleasures should be so much distinguished over other pleasures. He is not satisfied to be told that they are the most innocuous and the best; an, answer that (he says) leads to the same absurdity as before; the beautiful being made the cause, the good the effect; and the two thereby accounted different things. (Add to this what is given of *Beauty* in the body of this book.)

QUESTIONS FROM THE MADRAS UNIVERSITY CALENDARS.

1. On what grounds were the Sophists attacked by Socrates and Plato, and on what grounds are they defended in modern times?

2. J. S. Mill claims Socrates as a Utilitarian. Bentham, on the other hand, stigmatises Socrates as talking nonsense under the pretence of teaching wisdom and morality by which he means that he was an anti-utilitarian. Discuss the question so as to show which of the two is right.

3. Give your interpretation of the Socratic doctrine that Virtue is knowledge. Sidgwick says that the complementary Socratic doctrine that vice is caused by ignorance of virtue is a nearly unanswerable deduction from *two apparent truisms*.* Explain.

4. Give the points of distinction between the Socratic and the Pre-Socratic philosophy.

5. Give Plato's estimate of the teaching of the Sophists. How does Grote's view differ from Plato's? Discuss the relation of Socrates to the Sophists.

6. What is the philosophical view of the *daimonion* of Socrates? What were the Socratic Eros† and Irony? What is the significance of the Eros of Plato? Describe the method of attaining and proving true knowledge adopted by Socrates.

7. How far can Socrates be said to have taught the process of Induction and Definition?

8. In what respects was the teaching of Socrates opposed to the national morality, politics and religion?

9. Show how Plato completed the principles of his predecessors by harmonising them and bringing them together under one higher principle.

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* Sidgwick writes 'That *every one wishes for his own good and would get it if he could,*' an arguer would hardly venture to question; and, he would equally shrink from denying that *Justice and Virtue generally were goods, and of all goods the finest.* How then could he refuse to admit that *those who knew what were just and righteous acts would prefer nothing else, while those who did not know could not do them if they would,* which would land him at once in the conclusion of Socrates that justice and all other virtues were summed up in wisdom or knowledge of good?'

† *Eros*, the god of love.

10. How does Plato show that ordinary Consciousness is unreliable in its theoretical and its practical aspects?

11. Under what different aspects are Ideas conceived by Plato? What is Plato's account of the highest idea?

12. Does Plato afford an explanation of the co-existence of the ideas with the phenomena? In what senses is Plato both a Realist and an Idealist?

13. How does Aristotle criticise the Platonic theory of ideas?

14. Discuss Plato's view of the nature of the soul. How does he show its pre-existence in immortality?

15. Expound briefly what Plato means by the World of Ideas and point out the place within it held by the idea of Good. Discuss the question as to the relation between the Idea of Good and the Divine Being. Can the idea of Good be at all identified with the *Summum Bonum*?

16. What is the value of Plato's Psychology of his doctrine of Reminiscence? Explain the transcendental doctrine of the necessity of some such *nexus* (connection) between the sense-impressions and general notions, pointing out the great modern equivalent of the Platonic fancy.

17. Give a brief sketch of Plato's Eschatology* divested of the mythical form.

It may also be regarded as an explanation of the moral difficulties, recognised in ordinary human life. From this point of view, show that it constitutes (1) a justification of the Divine Government and (2) a vindication, within certain limits, of the Freedom of the Will.

18. Explain the Platonic Trichotomy † of the soul. How does Plato connect the triplicity of his Psychology with his fourfold division of virtue?

19. What is Plato's account of Pleasure? Explain his distinction between necessary and unnecessary Pleasures and the argument by which he proves the greater

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* *Eschatology*, from Gk *Eschatos*, the furthest, utmost, extreme, last, and *logos*, discourse, means the doctrine of the last or final things, as death, judgment and the events therewith connected.

† Division into three parts, from Gk. *Tricha*, threefold and *temnein*, to cut or divide.

value of the pleasures of intellect. How far is this argument valid?

(N.B. The latest and most developed form of Plato's physical theory of Pleasure and Pain is found in the *Timæus*, pp. 64—5. Sensation is there explained as the result of molecular movement in parts of the body whose minute particles are in a mobile condition. If the movement is a violent and sudden disturbance of the part affected out of its natural state, the result is pain: while the restoration of the organ to its natural state produces pleasure. But either disturbance or restoration may be gradual and imperceptible, so that there may be pain without consequent pleasure, and pleasure without antecedent pain . . . . The pleasures which spring from philosophy are the only pure pleasures: other pleasures are for the most part merely negative, consisting in a momentary release from pain. The inferior pleasure cannot be fully enjoyed except by one in whose soul reason is supreme.)

20. Discuss Plato's view of the relation between Ethics and Politics.

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21. Since Plato in his Dialogues has made Socrates the leading interlocutor and since Plato enunciates nothing in his own person, what means have we of discriminating between the contributions to Philosophy of Socrates and Plato respectively?

22. Give some account of the *modus operandi* of Socrates as a teacher, and in connection with this, explain what has been the irony of Socrates.

23. In describing his functions as a philosopher Socrates compared himself to his mother who was a midwife. What theory of the origin of knowledge is implied in this comparison? How is this theory developed in the Platonic doctrine of Reminiscence?

24 Aristophanes, in his comedies, identifies Socrates with the Sophists by lowering the character of the former; Grote does the same thing by elevating the character of the latter. Examine which is right or whether either is.

25. (*a*) Socrates first brought Philosophy down from heaven to earth. (*b*) Know thyself.

These quotations may be regarded as marking a new departure in philosophical speculation as introduced by Socrates. How? Protagoras taught that 'man is the measure of the universe'. Was the Socratic doctrine that self-knowledge lies at the basis of all true knowledge, the same as the doctrine of Protagoras above alluded to or different?

26. According to Aristotle, "To Socrates we may unquestionably assign two novelties, *viz.*, Inductive discourses and Definitions of general terms."

(*a*) Are we to understand from this that Socrates invented the Inductive method of Bacon and Mill, or what are we to understand by it?

(*b*) Show how the Socratic doctrine of knowledge by concepts was developed into the Platonic doctrine of Ideas, and explain fully the latter.

27. Enumerate the parts of the soul in the Psychology of Plato and state their relation to the body respectively.

28. State the various arguments by which Plato seeks to prove the Immortality of the Soul.

29. (*a*) According to J. S. Mill, the Socratic theory of the moral standard is utilitarianism. Examine this view, and state, with reasons, whether you agree with it or not.

(*b*) Examine whether, and how far, the apparently paradoxical identification of virtue with knowledge by Socrates is defensible.

30. In the *Republic*, Plato gives his theory of virtue (including a classification of the virtues) (1) as realised in the State, and (2) as realised in the individual. State his views in these respects.

PART II.

EVOLUTIONAL ETHICS.

[The ethical works principally of Dr. Bain and of Messrs Darwin, Martineau, Sidgwick, Sorley, Spencer, Stephen, Stirling and Sully have been consulted in the preparation of this part.]

1. Of the supporters of Evolution in the department of morals, Charles Darwin, Herbert Spencer and Leslie Stephen stand at the head. The Theory of Evolution, first set on foot by Darwin in the lower grades of existence, has become so prevalent that it has affected ethical thought and modified to a certain extent the current theories of morals. With a view to render clear the Evolution Theory, let me define two expressions occurring very often in the works of the upholders of Evolution.

Heredity.—Parents transmit to their children some of their peculiarities or characteristics, physical, mental or moral. Changes produced in the mind or brain of a parent, by association of ideas or otherwise, tend to be inherited by his offspring so that the development of any faculty or susceptibility of existing man may be hypothetically carried back into the prehistoric life of the human race. At present, however, the theory of heredity is usually held in conjunction with Darwin's theory of

Natural Selection.—According to which different kinds of living things in the course of a series of generations come gradually to be endowed with organs, faculties, and habits tending to the preservation of the individual or the species under conditions of life in which it is placed. In other words, there is a real variability in organisms, acting through the medium of the reproductive system; and when the progeny so varied finds itself better adapted for the surrounding conditions than its predecessors, it gains an ascendancy in the competition of the multitude of creatures for existence, establishes itself and exterminates those which it has vanquished.

2. Mr. Darwin in his *Descent of Man*, Mr. Herbert

Spencer in his *Data of Ethics*, and Mr. Leslie Stephen in his *Science of Ethics* have successively and at last elaborately applied the doctrine of animal evolution in general, and *natural selection* in particular, to explain the genesis of human morals out of prior conditions that were unmoral. As the process which they describe is, in their view, only the latest section of a development that indefinitely preceded all conscious life, their theory would seem to fall under the category of *Physical* systems. But it differs from the unpsychological schemes in this: that though it links the moral phenomena to the physical in one unbroken chain of causality, it allows that we have *internal* cognisance of the one, and external of the other; so that, while Nature is *monistic*, our knowledge of it is *dualistic*. Hence our process of learning may start from either end: from the cosmical laws of the outward sphere, or from introspective study of ourselves; and while one expositor may work consecutively downward from physiological data, another may work analytically upward from psychological experience, laying aside the differences as he goes, till the moral becomes the useful, and the useful the pleasurable, and the pleasurable the necessary; and at last the two advocates meet half way and find that they are saying one and the same thing. We cannot say that a doctrine thus elaborated is 'unpsychological.' On the contrary, it usually begins with the psychological preconception that, in the individual, the ethical sentiments are derivative from other feelings and ideas, *e. g.*, of sympathy, of beauty, of self-regard, so as to be resolvable into a generic term; and is then extended, by help of some law of heredity, to the inward life of parents and ancestors, and turned out complete in the form of a hypothetical psychology for the race or catena of races. How are we to *test* the imagined history? One condition is at all events indispensable; we must be sure of the ultimate phenomena, *viz.* the existing moral consciousness, of which this story undertakes to render account (*Martineau*).

3. *Evolution.*—A mode of generation in which the germ is held to pre-exist in the parent and its parts to be *developed* and not *formed* by any external act, or, to state generally, progress of being by development from within, under external conditions conducive to advance—falls under two heads, *dialectic and biological*. *Dialectic*

evolution, according to Hegel, is (*a*) unfolding of consciousness, (*b*) unfolding of the universe as a whole, in accordance with the logical relations of the categories of the understanding. This class of evolution forms no part of ethics. We have to do with the biological or organic evolution which implies : (*a*) development of varieties within the same species either by natural selection under altered external conditions or by artificial intervention under care of man ; (*b*) according to Darwin, development of species under the varying conditions above named. The theory of biological evolution, in its most advanced stage, seeks to complete a systematic history of life from its rise to its highest form, inclusive of man as an intellectual and moral being. This is the breadth of range contemplated by Darwin and by Spencer, the former having given special attention to scientific observation as concerned with relations of the lower species, the latter having devoted large attention to the possibilities of mental evolution.

Charles Darwin.

4. It was Darwin who showed the way in which progressive modifications in organisms generally take place. He showed that evolution has taken place by the 'natural selection' of organisms, so modified as to fit them for survival in the struggle for existence. The doctrine of 'natural selection' and 'survival of the fittest' means that, out of innumerable tentatives made at random by animals, the great majority come to nothing, but the exceptionally happy hits, that fall in with the surrounding adjustments, make their footing good, and stand. According to this naturalist view, organisms in which advantageous modifications have been produced tend to survive, and to transmit their modified or varied structure to descendants, while organisms in which such modifications or variations have not been produced are less able to preserve their life and to hand it on to successors. This view of evolution was a decided advance on that of Lamarck who discarded the false assumption of the existence of fixed differences between kinds of living things and held, with Wolff and Kant, the general doctrine that all living creatures have developed from simple germs, originally of like constitution, which have, in the course of time, become more heterogeneous and complex,

and so given rise to the wealth of organic life. Darwin's principle of variation has saved him from a cloud of misunderstanding which encircles Spencer's view of the end of moral actions. With him the creature is fitted up with no principle of unerring selection, but flung among the countless radii of accident, to find only by result the difference between the paths of life and death. But, according to Spencer, the creature is to be credited with *infallibility*, as he says that an animal can do nothing but the pleasantest and that the pleasantest is identical with the fittest and thereby bars out all failure.

5. REMORSE.—The feeling of self-reproach or remorse one of the characteristic features of conscience, Darwin explains as follows. 'Given, an animal with several instincts, some transient and intermittent, others persistent, so related as to be liable to conflict, and with also intelligence enough to secure memory of the past and reflection upon its images; and the feeling of remorse is certain to follow. For the most persistent of instincts, in a creature thus far developed, will be the social feeling of attachment to the community in which he lives; but stronger than this will often be, by fits and starts, some paroxysm of passing want or passion, as of hunger or of rage; so that his will is swept away by the more vehement assault. Afterwards, when the satisfied desire falls to sleep again, and in its absence the durable affection returns and makes him conscious of the hurt it has sustained, he cannot but experience, in this changed mood, regret for this short-sighted conduct: his temporary satisfaction has entailed on him a permanent pain. I am far from denying that the process here described really takes place: the question is, whether the feeling in which it issues is identical with the moral sentiment of which it professes to give an account. The whole stress of that explanation is thrown upon a *time-measure*: a short want is gratified: a long one is disappointed: so, the disappointment survives, and that is all.'

Disappointment ensues from want of prudence or error of the understanding and is not identical with guilt which is connected with a wrong motive and which induces self-reproach. Remorse, the true *moral* feeling, emerges only when we surrender to a lower spring of action against the remonstrance of a higher,—as when, in

the rush of passion, we hurt with bitter words an object of endearing love, or from cowardice, suffer in silence a calumny against the innocent. All these may alike come under Darwin's formula of *satisfying a short want at the expense of a long one;* but for that very reason, the formula touches nothing that characterises the *moral* nature, and misses the whole essence of the conscience which it undertakes to explain.

Herbert Spencer.

6. HERBERT SPENCER.—He defines Moral Science as the science of right conduct which has for its object to determine *how* and *why* certain modes of conduct are detrimental, and certain other modes beneficial. According to him, it is the business of moral science to deduce,* from the laws of life and the conditions of existence, what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness, and what kinds to produce unhappiness.

7. ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE ETHICS.—*Absolute Ethics* is not concerned with the conduct of actual human beings: its primary business is to 'formulate normal conduct in an ideal society—a society so ideal that in it normal conduct will produce 'pleasure unalloyed by pain anywhere.' The reasonings of Absolute Ethics are concerned with ascertaining *necessary relations* between actions and their consequences and 'deducing from necessary principles what conduct must be detrimental and what conduct must be beneficial' in an ideal society. '*Relative Ethics*' is concerned with determining how far the rules of 'Absolute Ethics' are to be taken as applicable to human beings here and now. *Absolute Ethics* pertains to a society which is perfect and whose enjoyment is unmixed with pain; *Relative Ethics* pertains to our present society which has many evolutions to undergo before it becomes ideal and perfect and whose enjoyment is imperfect and not without pain. Perfect adaptation of means to ends is the condition of a society to which Absolute Ethics belongs. The imperfect adaptation must, in the long run, tend to become perfect, when will be the crowning race of mankind.

Absolutely right conduct is that mode of conduct

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*Hence Moral Science is deductive. The laws of life, obtained by induction, are assumed by evolutionists as very necessary data for judging the morality of actions.

which, under the conditions arising from social union, must be pursued to achieve the greatest welfare of each and all, *i.e.*, which simultaneously achieves the greatest totality of life in self, in off-spring, and in fellowmen. Conduct is *relatively right* that, with the limitations and checks incident to their present state of society, produces a surplus of agreeable feeling or balance of pleasure over pain.

8. THE MORAL STANDARD.—The standards of the different Moral Schools have for their aim perfection of nature, virtuousness of action, or rectitude of motive and seem to derive their authority from the ultimate standard, *viz.*, surplus of agreeable feeling.

Perfection is synonymous with *goodness* in the highest degree; and hence to define good conduct in terms of perfection is indirectly to define good conduct in terms of itself. Naturally, therefore, it happens that the notion of perfection like the notion of goodness can be framed only in relation to ends.

Virtue.—If virtue is primordial and independent, virtuous conduct and pleasure-giving conduct plainly correspond with each other; but if virtue requires sacrifice, it may be immediately painful but will have prospective pleasure. Hence the conception of virtue cannot be separated from the conception of happiness-producing conduct.

Rectitude of Motive.—The intuitionalists maintain that rightness and wrongness, goodness and badness of actions are the declarations of conscience which is a divine implanting in our nature. Though they may be intuitions, the decisions of conscience are taken for gospel since conformity to them furthers the welfare of himself and others, and disregard of them entails in the long run suffering on all.

In conclusion, Pleasure somewhere, at some time, to some being or beings, is an inexpugnable element of the conception of right and good conduct. It is as much a necessary form of moral intuition as space is a necessary form of intellectual intuition.

9. WAYS OF JUDGING CONDUCT.—All the current methods of Ethics, irrespective of their distinct characters and their special tendencies, neglect ultimate causal connexions. *One* school upholds the alleged will of God as the rule of conduct; a *second* identifies morality with law

and maintains that rights are wholly results of convention; a *third* alleges that they are intuitions pure and simple; and the *fourth* determines utility only by observation of results. The first, *theological*, ignores consciousness of causation; the second, *political*, is deficient in it; the third, *intuitional*, denies it altogether, and the last, *utilitarian*, while admitting causation to a certain extent thinks it not possible to know by deduction from fundamental principles what conduct *must* be detrimental and what conduct *must* be beneficial. This neglect of ultimate causal connexions between actions and their consequences the evolutionists have attempted to do away with as moral phenomena are phenomena of evolution though they form but a part of the aggregate of phenomena which evolution has wrought out.

(*a*) *The Physical View.*—Between a savage and a civilised man the difference lies in the fact that the former observes no settled plan or arrangement in carrying out his purposes, simple or intricate, and that the latter is definite and exact in all his transactions. Thus, it will be evident that, when the forms of life ascend in a series and thereby render their structure and function increasingly heterogeneous, their conduct increases proportionately so. The increasing coherence, definiteness and heterogeneity of the combined motions are instrumental to the better maintenance of a moving equilibrium. When evolution advances, it is comparatively regular and enduring and its regularity and enduringness are greatest in the highest.

(*b*) *The Biological View.* Biology is the science of life and contains laws which, if observed, conduce to preservation, continuance and completeness of ife. According to this view, a moral man is he who discharges all his functions in degrees duly adjusted to the conditions of existence. Hence, the performance of every function is, in a sense, a moral obligation. The interaction of feelings and functions is essential to animal life in all its more developed forms. Every function produces pleasure or pain. Generally, pleasure-giving acts are life-sustaining acts and are, therefore, generally preferred. For every pleasure increases vitality, raises the tide of life; every pain decreases vitality and lowers the tide of life. But there are exceptions to this princi-

ple. Some pleasures are siren-like which first entice and then involve in ruin those who pursue them ; and some there are which, as in the case of solving difficult mathematical problems, are preceded by disagreeable states of consciousness. Hence, it will be seen that pleasures are not always connected with actions which must be performed, nor pains with actions which must be avoided.

It is one of the laws of nervous action that each stimulus, beyond a direct discharge to the particular organ acted on, indirectly causes a general discharge throughout the nervous system. Therefore, when a certain organ is stimulated, the rest of the organs under the control of the same nervous system, participate in the stimulation. This immediate physiological result is often ignored by theorizers in ethics when they prescribe rules of right living which are most conducive to human happiness. When complete adjustment of humanity to the social state is obtained, then will be recognised that completely right actions are those which, besides being conducive to future happiness, are immediately pleasurable too and that actions are completely wrong when they produce painfulness both proximately and utimately. To quote the language of Herbert Spencer.—"The adaptation of man's nature to the conditions of his existence cannot cease until the internal forces which we know as feelings are in equilibrium with the external forces they encounter And the establishment of this equilibrium is the arrival at a state of human nature and social organization such that the individual has no desires but those which may be satisfied without exceeding his proper sphere of action, while society maintains no restraints but those which the individual voluntarily respects.'

(*c*) *The Psychological View.* Here we have to see how and under what conditions the natural conduct will become the moral conduct. It is a fact of evolution that as the adaptation of inner related actions to outer related actions extends in range and variety, motive and act become more complex. Hence follows the corollary that the simple and less ideal feelings are less authoritative and directive than the more complex and ideal feelings. A caution is needed here. The control of the lower by the higher must be neither despotic, nor irrational. Morality is the product of a stable community, and it is well known

that a community is unstable so long as might is right, or the lower feelings predominate over the higher. When peace prevails and the society is in equilibrium, moral revlusion to the triumphs of might over right begins to work and gradually the higher feelings and restraints gain the upper hand. Morality asserts itself when despotism is done to death. In an ideal society which is chracterised by perfect adjustment of acts to ends, by complete equilibration between men's desires and the conduct necessitated by surrounding conditions, restraints and restrictions have no place, and the higher or moral actions become normal.

(*d*) *The Sociological View.*—From this point of view, Ethics becomes nothing else than a definite account of the forms of conduct that are fitted to the associated state, in such wise that the lives of each and all may be the greatest possible, alike in *length* and in *breadth*.

In times of war, the welfare of the society rather than that of the individuals is taken care of. But in times of peace when voluntary co-operation displaces compulsion with a view to safety and internal sustentation, the welfare of the units engages chief attention as the welfare of the aggregate largely depends on it. Voluntary co-operation becomes null and void only when benefits received are not proportionate to services rendered. For perfect peace to rest in a society, its unit shall not injure one another directly or indirectly but further the welware of others so that the complete life of each shall consist with, and conduce to the complete living of all. Harmonious co-operation, by which alone in any society the greatest happiness can be attained, is made possible only by respect of one another's claim, however much the greatest happiness attainable in each society may differ in nature, or amount or both.

10. THE RELATIVITY OF PAINS AND PLEASURES.—The standards of happiness differ not only with men of different races, but also wiih different men of the same race, and even with the same men at different periods of life. It is a physiological fact that the tastes for foods are relative not only to structures of the organs but to the condition of those structures as fitting or unfitting them for activity. So is it with the other senses Further, there is no fixed relation between the acting force and the pro-

duced feeling. The amount of feeling varies with the size of the organism, with the character of its structures, with the character of its nervous system, and also with the temporary states of the part affected, of the body at large and of the nervous centres. If we get rid of the tendency to think that certain modes of activity are necessarily pleasurable because they give us pleasure, and that other modes which do not please us are necessarily unpleasing, we shall see that the remoulding of human nature into fitness for the requirements of social life must eventually make all needful activities pleasurable while it makes displeasurable all activities at variance with thes from quirements. Then, the things now done with |dislikeking, a sense of obligation will be done with immediate reslei- and the things desisted from as a matter of duty will be desisted from because they are repugnant.

11. Egoism and Altruism.—By the Law of Progressive Development, sentient beings have progressed from low to high types, those surviving that stand their ground in the struggle for life. Thus egoism or self-preservation and gratification precede altruistic considerations. Should egoism be lost sight of altogether, the loss of that self-care inflicts on posterity deficient nature as it produces ill health to oneself which diffuses unhappiness to his family and all around. From this isolation of one's activities to the small sphere of self * there results not only an inability to help others but the infliction of positive burden on them. The advantage of one being egoistic is that he draws a hard and fast line between his claims and those of others whereby he serves as if indirectly the interests of those who are his neighbours. Pure altruism is also one sided. A total disregard of self may be the highest virtue but a virtue which saps the foundation. Parents often sacrifice their own convenience for the well-being of their children; but if they make a total sacrifice of themselves and murder their existence thereby, will it not be a *pound-foolish policy*? It is of course true as in the case of children that, when we work for others, we by implication work for ourselves. Disinterestedness is noble; but equity must be observed if we care for continuance of life and enjoyment of happiness. In the modern

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* "Self is a poor centre for a man's action"—H. S.

scientific world which has multiplied beyond measure the means of comfort, division of labor has become absolutely necessary and this division has caused mutual dependence indispensable for life. Hence, it may be drawn as a corollary that as fast as the dependence of societies on one another is increased by commercial intercourse, the internal welfare of each becomes a matter of concern to the others. Hence clearly our conclusion must be that general welfare is achieved mainly through the adequate pursuit of their own happinesses by individuals while reciprocally the happinesses of individuals are achieved *in part* by their pursuit of the general happiness. In proportion as mankind approach complete adjustment of their natures to social needs, there must be fewer and smaller opportunities for giving aid; for, there cannot be a beneficial interference between faculty and function when the two are adjusted. General altruism, in its developed form, must inevitably resist individual excesses of altruism—instead of each maintaining his own claims, others will maintain his claims for him. What spheres then will eventually remain for altruism? There are *three*. 1*st*. the sphere of family life; 2*nd*. the pursuit of social welfare at large; 3*rd*. the opportunities afforded by casualties, diseases and misfortunes. Though the spheres are few and limited, what now in the highest natures is occasional and feeble, may be expected with further evolution to become habitual and strong, and what now characterizes the exceptionally high, may be expected eventually to characterize all.

12. Criticism of Spencer's Philosophy.—Mr. Spencer is a through-going realist. From his general scheme of evolution, one would be prepared to find him avowing himself a materialist. Yet he seeks to avoid this conclusion by saying that it is one unknowable reality which manifests itself alike in the material and in the mental dominion. At the same time, this unknowable is commonly spoken of as *force* and in many places seems to be identified with *material force*. Mr. Spencer makes little use of his metaphysical conception in accounting for the evolution of things. He tells us neither why the unknowable should manifest itself in time at all, nor why it should appear as a material world before it appears under the form of mind

or consciousness. Indeed, Mr. Specner's doctrine of evolution cannot be said to have received from its author an adequate metaphysical interpretation. The idea of the unknowable hardly suffices to give to his system an intelligible monistic basis. In truth, this system seems in its essence to be *dualistic* rather than *monistic*. (*Sully.*)

13. THE END OF MORAL ACTIONS.—The Utilitarians had 'balance of pleasure over pain' as the criterion and method for determining the good and bad tendencies of actions. The Evolutional school substituted for the Benthamite criterion the preservation of human society or of the human race or still more generally 'quantity of life' as the end by conduciveness to which actions and characters are to be estimated. Leslie Stephen and his school maintain that a more scientific criterion of moral actions is obtained by investigating their conduciveness to the *efficiency of the social organism*—efficiency for the purposes of its own preservation. The primary question at issue is whether we are to regard preservation as the sole end; whether we are to be content with the *mere securing of existence* for humanity generally, instead of seeking to make the secured existence more desirable—whether, in short, the notion of *well-being* is to be reduced *to being with the promise of future being.* If this question were settled in the affirmative, it might then be further disputed how far the present condition of sociological knowledge is such as to render *conduciveness to the preservation of the social organism*, a criterion completely applicable to the scientific reconstruction of morality.

Leslie Stephen.

14. LESLIE STEPHEN.—Though Spencer and Stephen are both evolutionists, they differ in various ways. Stephen writes:—"Mr. Spencer has worked out an encyclopœdic system,* of which his ethical system is

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* Spencer seeks to enmesh the physical round of things, as science now orbs it to the instructed imagination, within a competent *Metaphysic;* he desires to fix in the centre a competent *Psychology*, consistent with this metaphysic, and yet empirically and physiologically educed; and he would fill up the interior, or what of it the physical sciences leave void, with a competent *Ethics*, a competent *Jurisprudence*, a competent *Æsthetics*, a competent *Science of Education*, and a competent *Science of Government* and *Politics*. (*D. Masson.*)

the crown and completion. I, on the contrary, have started from the old ethical theories, and am trying to bring them into harmony with the scientific principles which I take for granted. My aim is more limited, though we ought to coincide in results so far as we cover the same ground. I have, as it were, surveyed the province from within, without attempting to pass the frontiers, whilst he reaches the province after surveying the whole empire of scientific thought; and, therefore, I have laid stress upon some matters which he treats with comparative lightness, whilst in other cases the relation is reversed."

15. SOCIOLOGY.—Mr. Spencer regards it as sufficiently established to be able to predict definitely an ideal society in the remote future. Mr. Stephen, on the other hand, declares that sociology at present "consists of nothing more than a collection of unverified guesses and vague generalities, disguised under a more or less pretentious apparatus of quasi-scientific terminology." The theory of evolution brings out the fact that every organism, whether social or individual, represents the product of an indefinite series of adjustments between the organism and its environment.

16. ACTUAL AND IDEAL MORALITY.—The actual code is variable and the ideal fixed. *Is* and *ought* represent the two codes respectively. Actual morality is morality in conformity to the code which is actually operative at the given time. Ideal morality is one which prescribes what ought to be (moral). By the *moral code*, Mr. Stephen means a set of rules which, as a matter of fact, is respected in a given society, and so far determines the ordinary approvals and disapprovals as to be an effective force in governing conduct.

17. CONSCIENCE OR THE MORAL FACULTY.—Leslie Stephen considers conscience as a derived faculty and therefore makes a crusade against it 'as an elementary instinct, incapable *of further analysis*.' The evolutionist explanation of the Moral Faculty is that, *acquired* in the history of the race, it is transmitted from parent to child as an instinctive emotional susceptibility so that we are born with a moral sentiment or a *tendency*, to approve and disapprove, respectively, of actions, apart altogether

from their bearing on happiness. To Mr. Stephen it is a difficult question, 'how it comes to pass that the conscientious feeling, which is a function of the whole character and *not a specific faculty*, comes to have so distinctive a quality as is at least frequently attributed to it. If it is borne in mind that 'the conscientious feeling is a function of the character' *for the time being*, the difficulty is solved. Yet there is another difficulty, *viz.*, Mr. Stephen says that the conscientious *feeling* is a *function of character* and thereby inverts the usual order, *feeling first* and then *character*.

A second difficulty respecting the Moral Faculty is whether it is a *simple emotion* or an *intellectual perception*: if the former, 'it is more or less arbitrary;' if the latter, 'it is difficult to see how it can affect conduct.' No doubt he suggests that we evade the difficulty by setting it up 'as an independent faculty, invested with both intellectual and emotional attributes,' but it is an unjustifiable assumption. The union of feeling with idea is no unheard of peculiarity in our moral self-consciousness. Judgment and feeling always interacting in moral decisions address themselves to the particular before they grasp the general. Hence 'Do this' instead of 'Be this.' This does not ignore at all the consideration of motives in judging character and conduct.

All through his criticism, Mr. Stephen has conceived of the conscience not as a little seed of intuition capable of growth, but in its *formed state* when it has become a judgment of the whole character.

18. General characteristics of the Theory of Evolution.

(*a*) It is an assertion of the unity of life, or in its widest form, of the unity of existence.

(i) It is the *history* of an order of sequent facts and relations.

(ii) It gives an historical account of the growth of moral ideas and customs.

(iii) It points out the course of action to which human nature is adapted.

(*b*) It is a compromise (or go-between) between Intuitionism and Experientialism.

(c) It gives a scientific basis for the existing solidarity between man and society.

(d) It differentiates the moral from the non-moral and, for so doing, postulates infinite time and space.

(e) It has no psychology of its own, but merely picks up what best suits it of the old material, and fits it in with the purely *physiological* story it has to tell.

(f) Since the principle of natural selection which does not account for any progress made by universal benevolence only selects the modifications best fitted to promote life, it always implies an *independent* modification of the organism or is driven to take for granted the existence of a *definite instinct* as the worker of variations. Since the latter position is suicidal, an evolutionist trusts to the *sensory and passive susceptibility* of the animal life for the *creation and differentiation* of its *spontaneous activities.*

(g) It tends to produce not merely an ideal but an actual identification of individual and social interests, in which each man finds his own good in that of the state.

19. PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.*—They are *unity, variety* and *continuity.* The theory shows that there is a tendency, brought about by natural selection, for organisms, to harmonise with or become adapted to their environment—a tendency, that is to say, towards *unity* of organism and environment, and, in so far as external conditions are uniform, towards a general unity of life. Again, the theory implies *variation* in organisms, produced either by the unequal incidence of external forces, or by the spontaneous action of the organism, or by both causes combined. The mere increase in the number of living organisms leads to a modification of the

* This theory, philosophically or in ultimate analysis, is an attempt to prove that *design* or the objective idea, especially in the organic world, is developed in *time* by rational means. But any fruitful application even of *infinite time* to the general *problem of difference* in the world is inconceivable. (*Stirling*).

conditions of life by which new variations are encouraged. And this tendency to variation in organisms——not merely the diversity of external environment—is perpetually complicating the conditions which the former tendency, that towards unity, helps to bring into harmony. It thus happens that there is a continual process of readjustment and oscillation between the tendency towards *unity* and that towards *variety*, which, through opposition and conciliation, produces *continuity* in nature. Each newly formed unity between organism and environment is broken by a new variation of the organism or of the environment. which further complicates the problem to be solved by the unifying process, and gives scope for a more intricate and more comprehensive re-adjustment.

20. Evolution and Intuitionism.—Evolution has its own explanation to give of the seemingly intuitive character of moral ideas—showing how their immediate necessity for the individual of the present day may be reconciled with their empirical origin in the mental history of the race It offers terms of compromise between the *intuitional* and the *empirical* psychology of morals. It will admit the immediate and intuitive character in the individual of the sentiments which older empiricism had tried to make out to be composite, growing up in each person out of the materials afforded by his environment, and the experiences to which he was subjected. Prof. Sidgurick says, " Those who dispute the authority of moral or other intuitions on the ground of their derivation must be required to show, not merely that they are the effects of certain causes, but that these causes are of a kind that tend to produce invalid belief." The moral sentiments and intuitions may have resulted from different social conditions and their organic character. The *Evolution* of moral intuitions does not discredit their value, for, the mere fact of our possessing any moral intuition shows that the habits of action from which it was derived have been permanent enough to leave their traces on the mental structure, and that the conduct to which it leads, like the custom from which it came, will not destroy society, but, on the contrary, will probably tend to its permanence. The general attitude of evolution-theory is *one of trust modified by criticism.* In both, an

appeal is made from the axioms themselves: in the one case, to their historical genesis and the facts in which they originated; in the other, to the searching test of logical consistency, and their capability of being applied to conduct. The theory transforms intuitionism by the way in which it connects the individual with the race.

21. EVOLUTION AND EGOISM.*—The theory of evolution shows that human nature is infinitely varied, not only through the variety of circumstances but through the variety of inherited dispositions. It shows that an individual is organically related to all the members of the race. It has affected the relation of egoism to altruism by showing a social factor in the individual. The community has been called an organism, and the individual spoken of as a cell in the tissue of which it is composed, the difference between the two organisms, individual and social, being that the conscious centre is in the unit, not in the whole. The absence of a *social sensorium* makes us hesitate to identify the ends of individual with those of collective action.

22. EVOLUTION AND ALTRUISM.—Mr. Stephen divides all men into two classes, typified by the reasonable and therefore sympathetic man who has struck a bargain with society to take "common stock of pains and pleasures," and the systematically selfish man who "must be an idiot." This division is not sound, for the majority of men are neither entirely sympathetic nor yet systematically selfish. This imperfection is characteristic of the present stage of evolution which in its highest form bids fair to identify or make no difference between sympathy and selfishness. Hence, Mr. Spencer argues that pure altruism at present is suicidal and that evolution *tends* not to support but supplant egoism.

23. EVOLUTION AND UTILITARIANISM.—The theory of

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* Objections to this principle are :—

(1) There is no sure rule for carrying it out.—*Sidgwick.*
(2) It is fatal to self sacrifice.—*L. Stephen.*
(3) It is often at variance with virtue and duty.—*Ibid.*
(4) It does violence to the better side of human nature. —*M'Cosh.*
(5) It degrades benevolent action.—*Stephen.*
(6) It is the principle of sin.—*Martensen.*

Evolution has modified utilitarianism in *method* and in *principle*: in *method*, as the end of utilitarianism, greatest happiness, is *ultimate* and not *immediate*, *determinate* and *practical* and as the evolutionist has, therefore, to look for the immediate aim in conformity to the ethical principles deduced from the laws of that *highest life* which is now in process of evolution; in *principle*, as utilitarianism looks upon conduct from a *mechanical*, instead of from an *organic* point of view. Mr. Stephen and Miss Simcox object to the ideal of utilitarianism as unprogressive. A progressive ideal simply means an ideal which is incompletely comprehended, and the comprehension of which proceeds gradually with its realisation. At any time, the definition of such an ideal can only be tentative and no more. How came we by such an ideal? and how to apply it to practice? With men of fixed character in an unchanging society, our way might be comparatively clear. But when both character and social relations vary, and their variation extends to susceptibility to pleasure and pain, and depends on the action adopted to obtain the end, utilitarianism may well appear to be without a principle by which to deterimine between different kinds of conduct. Further, no principle can be extracted from utilitarian ethics even on the fundamental question as to whether happiness is to be obtained by the restriction of desires or by the satisfaction which leads to their recurrence and increase. The weakness of the utilitarian theory is its method of treating actions merely in respect of their *results*: the evolutionist must show how results are connected with motives,—how character and conduct are different aspects of a whole. Further, utilitarianism places the standard and test of conduct in its effects on the sensibility. The best is that which brings most pleasure. If pleasure is the only end and satisfaction is simply another name for it, then, it is plainly incorrect to say that 'it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.' As has been urged from the evolutionist point of view, 'there is no common measure of happiness to enable us to say that the more perfect being enjoys more of it than the less.' There seems one way only in which utilitarianism can bring its moral

ideal into harmony with the upward tendency claimed for itself by evolutionist ethics—and that is, by maintaining that the pleasures incident to what are regarded as the higher functions are the pleasures which excel others in respect of *fecundity:* they are the source of future pleasures, and are frequently inexclusive even in their present enjoyment. The difficulty in making this assertion is just that these *higher* pleasures are but slightly appreciated by the majority of men, and can hardly be said to be pleasures for them at all. But here the theory of evolution, whose adherents have been acting the part of the candid friend to utilitarianism, must come to its aid, and admit that human nature may be so modified in the future as to allow of the *highest* becoming also the *greatest* of pleasures. This argument in the mouth of the utilitarian is perhaps a somewhat arbitrary one, since it could be applied equally well to any class of pleasures. The notion of *higher* as applied either to conduct or to pleasure has been accepted from current moral opinion. But the theory of evolution has set itself to explain this notion, and to develop a theory of morality in harmony with its own scientific positions, and free from the defects which it has found in other systems. Thus, the doctrine of evolution first seized upon for rebutting the arguments of the intuitional moralists, has been found to transform rather than to destroy their system; and the utilitarianism in whose interests the new controversial weapon was employed, seems to have been subjected to a parallel process of transformation.

23. Evolutionism and the Ethical Ends.

THE ENDS.

- Subjective.
  - Happiness (Hedonism*)
    - Egoistic.
    - Universalistic.
      - Family.
      - Tribe.
      - Nation.
      - The Race.
- Objective.
  - Materialistic.
    - Welfare (Darwin).
  - Idealistic.
    - Perfection.
      1. Self denial.
      2. Self realization.
      3. Virtue.
      4. Absolute Good Will.
      5. Desire of Right or Love of Duty.
      6. Right.
      7. Duty.
      8. Worthiness.
      9. Blessedness.
      10. Good.

Happiness is a vague term and is often identified with utility. Though happiness theory is often spoken of as utilitarianism, it does not aim at mere utility in the sense in which it is opposed to pleasure. In moral philosophy, Utility includes Pleasure. The utilitarians hold promotion of happiness as the end, and Spencer, a rational utilitarian, holds maximum of happiness as the *ultimate* end and conformity to the laws of life as the *proximate end* or rather *means* to that ultimatum. Further, if happiness is one with pleasure, it must be remembered that pleasure and pain are not real phenomena with a distinguishable existence of their own, like sensations, conceptions, or actions; they have no trace of objectivity whatever, but

*Gk. *Edonikos* from *édone* (pleasure). The doctrine of the Cyrenaic sect that placed the highest good in Pleasure or the gratification of the senses. This is distinguished from *Eudemonism* (Gk. *Eudaimonismos*, happiness. from *Eudaimon*, happy, from *eu* well, good, and *daimon*, genius) which is that system of philosophy which derives the foundation of moral obligation from its relation to happiness or well-being.

are, as Hamilton puts it, *subjectively subjective.* Pleasure is a feeling of the subject dependent upon the objects, sensory and motor, present at any time to consciousness. Pleasure is often an accompaniment of activity or the resultant of it. "Pleasure changes with every modification of function." Mr. Martineau writes 'Pleasure does not start the heightened activity but closes it; and is no sooner reached than the strenuous exertion ceases because required no more. The initiative is taken by a *disturbance*, which puts the spur to us all the same, whether our quickened speed is destined to succeed or to fail, whether we are to quench our need or our need is to quench us.'

We are frequently told that the theory of evolution prescribes as the end *preservation* (self or social), *development*, or the *health of the society.* Preservation, attained by adaptation to environment, does not take account of the tendency to variation in all organisms. Hence, development including variability has been regarded as the end. How to measure development? Spencer says 'by the degree of complexity of act and motive.' Judged by this standard, Iago in Shakespeare's Othello is a perfectly moral character. The third end proposed is the health of the society. Mr. Martineau says that "Mr. Spencer's insistence on the laws of health, as factors in the determination of right action, would merit unqualified thanks, if he had not confused it by taking pleasure as the index to health, and assuming that the self-denying types of morality spring from a worship of pain, and were the chief source of a morbid and stunted humanity."

24. The Ethics of Evolution, when interpreted empirically, admits of reconciliation with the older theory of hedonism, by identifying life with pleasure—holding that the highest or most evolved life is that which contains most pleasure, and that increase of pleasure is, therefore, the end of conduct. In this way the end of evolutionism is reduced to the end of utilitarianism. Some utilitarians, on the other hand, sought to get rid of the difficulties of their calculus, by the assumption that the greatest pleasure would be found by following the direction of evolution. Any hedonistic theory might be met by the assertion that life is essentially a painful

experience and pleasure unattainable. But a similar objection tells with greater force against the combination of evolutionism and hedonism. For it holds the double position that the end is to promote life, and that life is promoted by adding to pleasure; or else that the end is pleasure, but that pleasure is to be got by following evolution. It postulates, therefore, that the progress of life tends, and tends even in a proportionate degree, to the increase of pleasure. Yet we could obtain no proof that this progress does, as a matter of fact, increase pleasure in any regular way. On the contrary, the facts of experience seem to show that life and pleasure do not advance proportionately, nor even always concomitantly. But a still more important and fundamental objection to the hedonistic form of evolution is deducible from the nature of pleasure itself; for it can be modified indefinitely, and always follows in the wake of function. Thus, the sole intelligible account we can give of what conduct will bring the greatest pleasure is, that it is the conduct which calls for the greatest amount of successful energising, that which employs the greatest number and the strongest. Hence, instead of being able to measure life by pleasure, we are driven to interpret pleasure in terms of life. Then life or the increase of life becomes the end. This view reduces itself to making a man's strongest and most persistent impulses both standard and end. And this is only an uncertain and shifting guide for conduct and an imperfect representation of what is expected from a progressive, because evolutionist, ethics. For these persistent impulses can only be regarded as the survival of past activities, and consequently; contains no ideal beyond that of continuing in the old paths, and re-treading an already well- beaten course. Just as from the *external end* of adaptation to environment, so from this *internal* or *subjective* principle, no ideal for progress nor any definite end of action is possible. *(Abridged from Sorley's Ethics.)*

25. Hitches in the Evolutionary Deduction.—Evolution consists in *the perpetual emergence of something new which is an increment of being* upon its prior term, and therefore, more than its equivalent, and entitled to equal confidence and higher rank. This, however, though holding good throughout, has an exceptionally forcible valid-

ity *at certain stages* on which it is desirable to pause. In the evolution of life from the lower to the higher by the adjustment of the organism in relation to the external conditions, a *new departure* is felt when pain and pleasure come upon the scene and mingle with the eddy of molecules and appear as strangers, for whose entrance the physical elements decline to be responsible. This new element is the undeduced and undeducible one of *feeling or consciousness.* From this stage evolution works on the line of mental laws and meets with a *crux* when two conflicting impulses dispute possession of us and clamour for our decision of the alternative. This *choice* introduces *Free-will* and the dawn of moral idea. Thus, the birth of consciousness and the birth of duty are breaches in the course of natural evolution which no theory can bridge over. Hence, it is impossible to establish a catena of causality which shall link mind and matter into a single line. Hence, Mr Martineau concludes the subject with the telling sentence that 'the Evolution-hypothesis, meeting with a chasm in *two places*, is broken as a reasoned scheme, *into three* pieces, empirically successive, but logically detached.'

QUESTIONS.

I. State the chief characteristics of the evolution theory of ethics.

It has been said that the evolutional theory effects a reconciliation between experientialism and utilitarianism. Could we go a little further and say that the doctrine of evolution effects a union between the utilitarian and intuitional theory in Ethics?

2. What exactly is the relation betwen Ethics and Sociology? Does the dependence of ethics on the theory of a social organism necessitate any material modification of ethical principles?

3. On what grounds does Mr Spencer rest his contention that morality is fundamentally a deductive science? Compare his method with the method of ordinary Utilitarianism on the one hand and with that of Intuitionism on the other.

4. What does Mr Spencer mean when he says th

Ethics has a physical, a biological and a sociological aspect? Viewed in any or all of these aspects, is the essential character of moral action brought to light? Discuss the question.

5. Admitting the fact of inheritance of bodily characteristics, examine the evidence adduced in favor of hereditary transmission of intellectual and moral faculties and capacities. What are supposed to be the intermediate links in the chain of causation connecting the intellectual and moral attributes of the child with those of the parent?

6. What modification in conception or mode of statement or in both must the greatest happiness principle undergo if it be extended downwards and be taken as a principle of action holding good among the lower animals? Do these modifications affect the essential character of utilitarianism or only its accidental features?

7. Is it indispensable to a system of Evolutionary Ethics that utility in some form be accepted as the Ethical end? Compare and discuss the ethical end advocated by Darwin, H. Spencer, and Mr. Leslie Stephen respectively.

8. Examine critically the process by which, according to Darwin, the social instincts of the lower animals gradually develop into moral sentiments. In passing from the lower animals to man, what transformation, according to Darwin, does the moral sentiment undergo, and how is the transformation brought about?

Admitting for the sake of argument the existence of a moral sentiment among the lower animals, what do you regard as the most striking difference between the highest manifestations of the brute conscience and the lowest form of the human conscience? Is the difference such as can be satisfactorily accounted for on the principle of evolution?

9. Might one (an Intuitionist for example) admit in the fullest manner the gradual development of moral ideas and feelings from the earliest historical times to the present day without thereby logically committing oneself to the evolutionary hypothesis of the devolopment of moral sentiment among the lower animals and the hereditary transmission and strengthening of moarl faculty and

ıpacity among human beings? Discuss the question

10. Discuss the ordinary experiential theory of a ɛrivative conscience. What missing elements does evo-tion profess to supply? Does the addition of these ele-ɛnts strengthen the experiential position or does it, on ıe contrary, bring into prominence the essential sound-ness of the objection urged against it by the intuitional school?

11. How does the evolutionist explain the genesis ƒ Remorse? Does the explanation leave any residuum ıot accounted for?

Is obligation a merely transitory phase of morality a permanent and essential feature of it? Discuss the ɛws of evolutionary moralists, Darwin, H. Spencer and Stephen.

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12. What are the views usually adopted by In-ıitionists and Experientialists respectively regarding ıe coincidence of duty and happiness? Compare this ith the views of Epicureans and Stoics as representing ıcient thought and with those of Spencer and Stephen s representing modern evolution.

13. Describe briefly the three leading doctrines ɛgarding the freedom of the will, and show which of them in harmony with the theory of evolution.

N.B.—The will is (1) self-caused and free; (2) determined by the ego; (3) the strongest motive that prevails and forms character. The third seems consonant with evolution.

14. Compare the ethical methods of intuitionists, utilitarians and evolutionists, noticing any historical changes that have taken place in those of the first and second. Are intuitionism and utilitarianism open to the charge which Mr. Spencer brings against them "that they neglect ultimate causal ... exions?"

15. Point out and ... e value of the most important modificati... s ... o utilitarianism by ... arwin and Spenc...

16. How b... o the existence or ı-existence o... en affected by the ... lution the...

17. Do... e difficulties ex-... nced (1)... g the utilitarian ... 's determined

by their bearing on happiness, and (2) by the utilitaris in proving his standard and applying it to the conplicate problems of human conduct?

18. While recognising the general validity of certain moral rule, A. B feels disposed to treat his ow case as an exception and to violate the rule. How wou his case be dealt with by the Intuitionist, the Utilitarian and the Evolutionist respectively?

19. Compare Mr. Spencer's 'sphere of absolut moraliy' with Kant's 'realm of ends.'

20. What is meant by moral obligation *? Com pare Mr. Spencer's account of the genesis and growth c this sentiment with that of utilitarians and with the I tuitional theory. How, according to Spencer, will the fe ing of obligation be affected by progressing evolution

21. It has been said that the value of moral d trines is proportional to the degree of moral power whic they confer. Indicate the precise sense, if any, in whic this is true. Apply the test to Intuitionism and Utlit rianism, and point out whether, in your opinion, evoluti can enhance the moral powe r of the latter.

22. Can the knowledge of how man has be produced help us to know what he *is* and what he *oug* to be?

23. What is the influence of heredity in mo evolution?

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*Mr. Spencer construes *Obligation* into the "indispensableness of using the means if we could get the end."

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